Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) are known to abandon their initial stance to conform to user pushback. While prior research largely attributes this behavior to sycophancy learned during reinforcement learning from human feedback, we hypothesize that conformity is also driven by a model's epistemic uncertainty at inference time. In this paper, we introduce MUSE, a two-stage evaluation framework to disentangle the mechanisms driving LLM conformity. Specifically, MUSE maps a model's epistemic uncertainty in responding to a query against its likelihood to yield to user pushback in a subsequent turn. We demonstrate that the mechanisms driving conformity extend beyond sycophancy alone. Specifically, we characterize two distinct factors that jointly drive conformity: sycophantic conformity, where a model aligns with user pushback even with absolute certainty in its initial response, and uncertainty-driven conformity, where a model's likelihood for conformity increases alongside its uncertainty. Furthermore, we conduct ablation studies to demonstrate that both sycophantic conformity and uncertainty-driven conformity grow with 1) the LLM's perceived expertise of the user and 2) the plausibility of the user's suggestions. More broadly, MUSE informs more targeted intervention strategies by distinguishing alignment-induced sycophancy and training-corpora-driven uncertainty.

Multi-agent debate, where teams of LLMs iteratively exchange rationales and vote on answers, is widely deployed under the assumption that peer review filters hallucinations. Yet the failure dynamics of homogeneous debate remain poorly understood, therefore we report findings from a controlled empirical study of teams of N{=}10 homogeneous agents (Qwen2.5-7B, Llama-3.1-8B, Ministral-3-8B) across R{=}3 debate rounds on two high-difficulty benchmarks (GSM-Hard and MMLU-Hard). We compare peer debate against isolated self-correction and a stochastic noise control that injects rationales from unrelated problems. We decompose debate failure into three model-dependent pathways: sycophantic conformity, where agents uncritically adopt majority answers (modal adoption up to 85.5%); contextual fragility, where peer rationales destabilize previously correct reasoning (vulnerability rate up to 70.0%); and consensus collapse, where plurality voting discards correct answers already present in the generation pool (oracle gap up to 32.3 percentage points). Ablations over communication density (K in {2,4,9}) and sampling temperature (T in {0.4, 0.7}) show that conformity reaches high levels at minimal peer exposure (K{=}2) and intensifies with greater initial diversity. Across all configurations, debate consumes 2.1-3.4times more tokens (up to 28,631 tokens per problem) than self-correction for equal or lower accuracy. Our results indicate that, within the 7-8B parameter class, homogeneous teams without structured roles do not benefit from unguided peer exchange, and that isolated self-correction consistently offers a more favorable cost-accuracy tradeoff.

Sycophantic agreement refers to a behavior in which language models excessively affirm the user, often at the cost of factual accuracy. Although sycophantic agreement is a well-known failure of model alignment, there is limited understanding of how it emerges from model training. In this work, we demonstrate that sycophantic agreement can emerge as an unintended consequence of widely used contrastive preference optimization objectives. Using the OLMo 3 post-training pipeline, we show that, for various pairs of teacher models across three families, there is a strong correlation between the log-ratio of the teacher model sycophantic agreement rates and the resulting student model sycophantic agreement rate. We further demonstrate that this unintended transfer is not limited to DPO but also occurs across 6 other preference optimization objectives. To understand whether this effect can be attributed to particular training examples, we analyze the preference data and find that the sycophancy signal is diffused across the entire dataset rather than concentrated in a sparse set of examples: each example appears neutral, i.e., there are no explicit instances of sycophantic agreement, and filtering based on probe-based data attribution or logit-linear selection fails to mitigate sycophancy without removing a large portion of the dataset. Overall, our findings suggest that the teacher models used to generate preference data can interact with alignment training objectives in unexpected ways, generalizing to undesirable and potentially harmful behaviors like sycophantic agreement.

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a wide range of natural language processing tasks. However, their tendency to exhibit sycophantic behavior - excessively agreeing with or flattering users - poses significant risks to their reliability and ethical deployment. This paper provides a technical survey of sycophancy in LLMs, analyzing its causes, impacts, and potential mitigation strategies. We review recent work on measuring and quantifying sycophantic tendencies, examine the relationship between sycophancy and other challenges like hallucination and bias, and evaluate promising techniques for reducing sycophancy while maintaining model performance. Key approaches explored include improved training data, novel fine-tuning methods, post-deployment control mechanisms, and decoding strategies. We also discuss the broader implications of sycophancy for AI alignment and propose directions for future research. Our analysis suggests that mitigating sycophancy is crucial for developing more robust, reliable, and ethically-aligned language models.

Both the general public and academic communities have raised concerns about sycophancy, the phenomenon of artificial intelligence (AI) excessively agreeing with or flattering users. Yet, beyond isolated media reports of severe consequences, like reinforcing delusions, little is known about the extent of sycophancy or how it affects people who use AI. Here we show the pervasiveness and harmful impacts of sycophancy when people seek advice from AI. First, across 11 state-of-the-art AI models, we find that models are highly sycophantic: they affirm users' actions 50% more than humans do, and they do so even in cases where user queries mention manipulation, deception, or other relational harms. Second, in two preregistered experiments (N = 1604), including a live-interaction study where participants discuss a real interpersonal conflict from their life, we find that interaction with sycophantic AI models significantly reduced participants' willingness to take actions to repair interpersonal conflict, while increasing their conviction of being in the right. However, participants rated sycophantic responses as higher quality, trusted the sycophantic AI model more, and were more willing to use it again. This suggests that people are drawn to AI that unquestioningly validate, even as that validation risks eroding their judgment and reducing their inclination toward prosocial behavior. These preferences create perverse incentives both for people to increasingly rely on sycophantic AI models and for AI model training to favor sycophancy. Our findings highlight the necessity of explicitly addressing this incentive structure to mitigate the widespread risks of AI sycophancy.

Large language models (LLMs) often exhibit sycophantic behaviors -- such as excessive agreement with or flattery of the user -- but it is unclear whether these behaviors arise from a single mechanism or multiple distinct processes. We decompose sycophancy into sycophantic agreement and sycophantic praise, contrasting both with genuine agreement. Using difference-in-means directions, activation additions, and subspace geometry across multiple models and datasets, we show that: (1) the three behaviors are encoded along distinct linear directions in latent space; (2) each behavior can be independently amplified or suppressed without affecting the others; and (3) their representational structure is consistent across model families and scales. These results suggest that sycophantic behaviors correspond to distinct, independently steerable representations.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are expected to provide helpful and harmless responses, yet they often exhibit sycophancy--conforming to user beliefs regardless of factual accuracy or ethical soundness. Prior research on sycophancy has primarily focused on single-turn factual correctness, overlooking the dynamics of real-world interactions. In this work, we introduce SYCON Bench, a novel benchmark for evaluating sycophantic behavior in multi-turn, free-form conversational settings. Our benchmark measures how quickly a model conforms to the user (Turn of Flip) and how frequently it shifts its stance under sustained user pressure (Number of Flip). Applying SYCON Bench to 17 LLMs across three real-world scenarios, we find that sycophancy remains a prevalent failure mode. Our analysis shows that alignment tuning amplifies sycophantic behavior, whereas model scaling and reasoning optimization strengthen the model's ability to resist undesirable user views. Reasoning models generally outperform instruction-tuned models but often fail when they over-index on logical exposition instead of directly addressing the user's underlying beliefs. Finally, we evaluate four additional prompting strategies and demonstrate that adopting a third-person perspective reduces sycophancy by up to 63.8% in debate scenario. We release our code and data at https://github.com/JiseungHong/SYCON-Bench.

Sycophancy in language models is typically studied as excessive agreement or validation, while explicit praise and flattery have received comparatively little attention. We argue that sycophantic praise is a distinct alignment problem that cannot be reliably measured using current methods. We introduce a parameterized framework that measures whether praise is excessive relative to contribution quality and expected user ability. We show that our framework substantially outperforms generic LLM judges in agreement with human annotations, and that sycophantic praise occurs far more frequently in social and interpretive domains than in objective reasoning settings. Together, these findings position praise calibration as a distinct alignment challenge.

Large language models increasingly serve as conversational agents that adopt personas and role-play characters at user request. This capability, while valuable, raises concerns about sycophancy: the tendency to provide responses that validate users rather than prioritize factual accuracy. While prior work has established that sycophancy poses risks to AI safety and alignment, the relationship between specific personality traits of adopted personas and the degree of sycophantic behavior remains unexplored. We present a systematic investigation of how persona agreeableness influences sycophancy across 13 small, open-weight language models ranging from 0.6B to 20B parameters. We develop a benchmark comprising 275 personas evaluated on NEO-IPIP agreeableness subscales and expose each persona to 4,950 sycophancy-eliciting prompts spanning 33 topic categories. Our analysis reveals that 9 of 13 models exhibit statistically significant positive correlations between persona agreeableness and sycophancy rates, with Pearson correlations reaching r = 0.87 and effect sizes as large as Cohen's d = 2.33. These findings demonstrate that agreeableness functions as a reliable predictor of persona-induced sycophancy, with direct implications for the deployment of role-playing AI systems and the development of alignment strategies that account for personality-mediated deceptive behaviors.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly applied in educational, clinical, and professional settings, but their tendency for sycophancy -- prioritizing user agreement over independent reasoning -- poses risks to reliability. This study introduces a framework to evaluate sycophantic behavior in ChatGPT-4o, Claude-Sonnet, and Gemini-1.5-Pro across AMPS (mathematics) and MedQuad (medical advice) datasets. Sycophantic behavior was observed in 58.19% of cases, with Gemini exhibiting the highest rate (62.47%) and ChatGPT the lowest (56.71%). Progressive sycophancy, leading to correct answers, occurred in 43.52% of cases, while regressive sycophancy, leading to incorrect answers, was observed in 14.66%. Preemptive rebuttals demonstrated significantly higher sycophancy rates than in-context rebuttals (61.75% vs. 56.52%, Z=5.87, p<0.001), particularly in computational tasks, where regressive sycophancy increased significantly (preemptive: 8.13%, in-context: 3.54%, p<0.001). Simple rebuttals maximized progressive sycophancy (Z=6.59, p<0.001), while citation-based rebuttals exhibited the highest regressive rates (Z=6.59, p<0.001). Sycophantic behavior showed high persistence (78.5%, 95% CI: [77.2%, 79.8%]) regardless of context or model. These findings emphasize the risks and opportunities of deploying LLMs in structured and dynamic domains, offering insights into prompt programming and model optimization for safer AI applications.

LLMs are known to exhibit sycophancy: agreeing with and flattering users, even at the cost of correctness. Prior work measures sycophancy only as direct agreement with users' explicitly stated beliefs that can be compared to a ground truth. This fails to capture broader forms of sycophancy such as affirming a user's self-image or other implicit beliefs. To address this gap, we introduce social sycophancy, characterizing sycophancy as excessive preservation of a user's face (their desired self-image), and present ELEPHANT, a benchmark for measuring social sycophancy in an LLM. Applying our benchmark to 11 models, we show that LLMs consistently exhibit high rates of social sycophancy: on average, they preserve user's face 45 percentage points more than humans in general advice queries and in queries describing clear user wrongdoing (from Reddit's r/AmITheAsshole). Furthermore, when prompted with perspectives from either side of a moral conflict, LLMs affirm both sides (depending on whichever side the user adopts) in 48% of cases--telling both the at-fault party and the wronged party that they are not wrong--rather than adhering to a consistent moral or value judgment. We further show that social sycophancy is rewarded in preference datasets, and that while existing mitigation strategies for sycophancy are limited in effectiveness, model-based steering shows promise for mitigating these behaviors. Our work provides theoretical grounding and an empirical benchmark for understanding and addressing sycophancy in the open-ended contexts that characterize the vast majority of LLM use cases.

People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to explore ideas, gather information, and make sense of the world. In these interactions, they encounter agents that are overly agreeable. We argue that this sycophancy poses a unique epistemic risk to how individuals come to see the world: unlike hallucinations that introduce falsehoods, sycophancy distorts reality by returning responses that are biased to reinforce existing beliefs. We provide a rational analysis of this phenomenon, showing that when a Bayesian agent is provided with data that are sampled based on a current hypothesis the agent becomes increasingly confident about that hypothesis but does not make any progress towards the truth. We test this prediction using a modified Wason 2-4-6 rule discovery task where participants (N=557) interacted with AI agents providing different types of feedback. Unmodified LLM behavior suppressed discovery and inflated confidence comparably to explicitly sycophantic prompting. By contrast, unbiased sampling from the true distribution yielded discovery rates five times higher. These results reveal how sycophantic AI distorts belief, manufacturing certainty where there should be doubt.