Arenas of potential conflict must be regulated  Conflict needs to be regulated, and something that can start conflicts even more so. Warfare and conflict is currently regulated by the Geneva Conventions that seek to limit the effects of armed conflict and regulate the conduct of the involved actors. [1] Just as importantly there are rules on what weapons can be used through various treaties that ban weapons such as the Land Mine Ban, [2] and on when a state can legally initiate conflict through the UN Charter.  In just the same way when a new area of potential conflict arises that too must be regulated by treaty. The internet and the threat of cyber-conflict is that new area at the moment. While cyber warfare is not currently a large scale threat it is still a form of conflict that could escalate just like any other - the Pentagon has explicitly stated it could respond militarily to a cyber-attack. [3] As a result it is most sensible to draw up the rules and regulations early, to ensure everyone knows the consequences and prevent damage by making sure that states agree not to engage in offence cyber-attacks against each other.  [1] ‘The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols’, ICRC, 29 October 2010,   [2] ‘Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction’, un.org, 18 September 1997,   [3] Brookes, Adam, ‘US Pentagon to treat cyber-attacks as ‘acts of war’’, BBC News, 1 June 2011,


global house would create international treatyban cyber attacks

While there are bans on certain weapons these are because such weapons are considered beyond the pale. This is either because they are horrifying as in the case of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, or indiscriminate as with land mines. This does not apply to cyber warfare. Other regulations similarly do not provide a good parallel as the Geneva conventions seek to limit the effects of armed conflict a similar treaty is clearly not necessary for cyber-conflict because the effects will already be limited by the type of conflict. Ultimately cyber-attacks are much more akin to espionage and are not regulated because they are small scale, localised, and have limited effects as well as being difficult to trace.


It is unlikely that all states would see this as beneficial to them. There will always be some states that benefit more from engaging in cyber-attacks than others – usually the underdog in other areas. If cyber-attacks are an area being used to redress the balance then why should they be willing to restrict their freedom of action? This is why Russia is unwilling to engage in deep cuts in the number of nuclear weapons it has – they are the main area of armaments in which they have an advantage over their potential adversaries.


The use of the internet undermines the state by demonopolizing the use of force  Ever since the state rose to ascendancy over powerful internal actors, such as the nobility in a feudal system, the state has had a monopoly on the use of force. The state quickly became the only institution with the resources to maintain military forces and has become the only legitimate wielder of force. The internet however changes this. Cyber-attacks are often by individuals or groups who can carry out a cross border attack without the aid of their home country.  In 2011 CIA director Leon Panetta told Congress “when it comes to national security, I think this represents the battleground for the future. I've often said that I think the potential for the next Pearl Harbor could very well be a cyber-attack.” [1] If cyber-attacks are so important it stands to reason that the groups who are able to engage in such activities should be as limited as possible. While it is not always possible states try to make sure that the weapons of war for the most part remain in the hands of responsible actors. This should apply as much in cyberspace as elsewhere. While terrorist groups do exist – and are occasionally armed by states – for the most part they are seen by every government as being illegitimate.  [1] Serrano, Richard A., ‘U.S. intelligence officials concerned about cyber attack’, Los Angeles Times, 11 February 2011,


A cyber treaty benefits everyone  A treaty that bans, or sharply curtails cyber-attacks would benefit every state. Even those who may currently benefit from cyber espionage would be better off signing up to the treaty.  First most cyber-attacks are not carried out by the state even in countries like China where the state is using the internet as an offensive tool. In its annual report to congress the Department of Defence stated some cyber-attacks “appear to be attributable directly to the Chinese government and military” but this does not sound like a majority. [1]  Secondly no state wants a risk of conflict as a result of an unregulated new field of potential conflict. Or even to risk relations with other nations; cyber-attacks in large part go on because they are cost free.  And finally all nations are the victims of cyber-attacks. The United States has repeatedly condemned cyber-attacks against it but China also claims that it is the victim of cyber-attacks. China’s Minister of National Defense General Chang Wanquan says “China is one of the primary victims of hacker attacks in the world.” [2] Having a treaty against cyber attacks would not only make business easier for all countries but it would build up trust between nations where it is currently being eroded.  [1] Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Annual; Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013’, Department of Defense,  p.36  [2] Brook, Tom Vanden, ‘Cyber attack? What cyber attack?’, USA Today, 19 August 2013,


Clearly cyber-attacks are not currently deadly but this does not mean they will not become so in the future. Leon Panetta has warned “A cyber-attack perpetrated by nation states or violent extremist groups could be as destructive as the terrorist attack of 9/11”. Such an attack would be indirect – unlike setting a bomb – but could be just as effective “An aggressor nation or extremist group could gain control of critical switches and derail passenger trains, or trains loaded with lethal chemicals. They could contaminate the water supply in major cities, or shut down the power grid across large parts of the country.” [1] At the moment systems are not really connected enough to allow this but it is pretty much certain that technology will become more sophisticated, control more systems, and become more and more connected. This is immensely beneficial economically but does create vulnerability.  [1] Garamone, Jim, ‘Panetta Spells out DOD Roles in Cyberdefense’, American Forces Press Service, 11 October 2012,


There is no reason to assume that nations cannot get along on the issue of cyber security just because cooperation has not been prevalent so far. The US and China despite regularly accusing each other of launching cyber-attacks have set up a joint US-China working group on cyber security. [1] There is clearly a willingness to work together on this issue.  As to working out who is behind attacks the United States at least claims to be capable of doing this. Panetta says the Department of Defence can track attacks so “Potential aggressors should be aware that the United States has the capacity to locate them and hold them accountable for actions that harm America or its interests.” [2] That computers in multiple countries should be taken over in order to launch an attack should simply provide another reason why all nations should want to be involved in preventing cyber-attacks.  [1] ‘US-China cyber security working group meets’, BBC News, 9 July 2013,   [2] Garamone, Jim, ‘Panetta Spells out DOD Roles in Cyberdefense’, American Forces Press Service, 11 October 2012,


A treaty would benefit larger powers over the small  Any treaty that seeks to ban cyber-attacks would simply be an attempt to cement the position of the most powerful countries at the expense of weaker ones. This is because cyber-attacks are, like terrorism, weapons that can be used by anyone to attack a much bigger target. To launch a cyber-attack there is little need for training, only a small amount of comparatively cheap equipment (to military hardware at any rate), and an internet connection. [1] And it is difficult to defend against. This makes it ideal for poor nations to maintain cyber warfare as a credible threat to their bigger neighbours while their neighbours threaten them conventionally with their bigger militaries. We have seen before arms treaties that are fundamentally biased in favour of a small group of powerful states. Most notable is the Nuclear non-proliferation treaty where there are five recognised nuclear weapons states who are allowed the horrific weapons and everyone else is banned from having them. This discrimination was accepted as a result of the agreement that the nuclear weapons states would eventually disarm. It has not happened so leaving a troubled treaty system that appears to be regularly flouted. [2]  [1] Phillips, Andrew T., ‘Now Hear This – The Asymmetric Nature of Cyber Warfare’, U.S. Naval Institute, Vol.138/10/1316, October 2012,   [2] Miller, Steven E., ‘Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2012,


Unlike warfare cyber-attacks don’t kill so they don’t need to be restricted in the same way  Warfare needs to be closely regulated because of the numbers of people who can be killed and the devastation that can result. This is not something that is a concern with cyber-attacks. So far cyber-attacks have not been very effective. ‘Stuxnet’ was a computer worm targeted an important control system in the Iranian nuclear program sabotaging gas centrifuges by making them run out of control. It was created by US and Israeli intelligence yet was not particularly effective, and certainly did not kill anyone. [1] Other major attacks have infected a large number of machines, such as ‘Shamoon’ that attacked the Saudi state oil company ARAMCO which affected 30,000 computers, but again this is simply destruction of property. [2] No matter how indiscriminate cyber-attacks may be that they don’t cause large numbers of deaths means there is little need to ban such attacks – it simply does not matter if attackers don’t follow a set of conventions like the Geneva conventions.  [1] Barzashka, Ivanka, ‘Are Cyber-Weapons Effective? Assessing Stuxnet’s Impact on the Iranian Enrichment Programme’, RUSI Journal, Vol.158, Issue 2, 28 April 2013,   [2] Garamone, Jim, ‘Panetta Spells out DOD Roles in Cyberdefense’, American Forces Press Service, 11 October 2012,


It would never work  There are immense challenges to making a treaty seeking to prevent or curtail cyber-attacks work. Even on issues where there are clear security concerns it is unusual for the involved nations to be willing to get along and cooperate. This has proven to be the same with regards to the internet governance with Russia and China wanting greater state control while the US and Western Europe is opposed. [1] Even on issues where lives are being lost there is often no global agreement as can be seen by the deadlock in the UN security council over what to do about the civil war in Syria. [2]  Additionally there is the problem that working out who engaged in a cyber-attack is difficult. Such attacks are often routed through proxy computers to launch their attacks. If attacking a difficult target that may seek to strike back the attack will be through numerous proxies which will be in numerous countries to make tracking back difficult. [3] This means there can be misattribution of attacks creating confusion about which state needs to act domestically to prevent the cyber-attacks – or in the worst case resulting in a response aimed at the wrong country. For example South Korea has blamed its Northern neighbour for an attack on the website of the South Korean Presidency but the hacking is more likely to have been the work of someone in South Korea itself as a South Korean detailed his plans on Twitter before the attack. [4] If it is difficult to attribute who launched the attack then it would clearly be easy to get around any ban.  [1] Nebehay, Stephanie, ‘China, Russia seek greater control of Internet’, Reuters, 7 March 2013,   [2] Black, Ian, ‘UN may struggle to respond to reports of Syrian chemical attacks’, The Guardian, 21 August 2013,   [3] Greenemeier, Larry, ‘Seeking Address: Why Cyber Attacks Are So Difficult to Trace back to Hackers’, Scientific American, 11 June 2011,   [4] Koo, Soo-Kyung, ‘Cyber Security in South Korea: The Threat Within’, The Diplomat, 19 August 2013,


Everyone would benefit from the potential closure of a zone of possible future conflict. While cyber warfare may give a smaller state a brief advantage due to some low cost methods of attack ultimately the superior resources, both in defence and attack in cyberspace of the richer state would be telling. In the United States the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) alone has a budget of $1.54billion for research into cyber offence from 2013-2017 [1] considering that there are numerous other agencies involved in cyber warfare or defence, or monitoring the internet it is clear that cyber-attacks are not some wonder weapon that can even the odds between states.  [1] Kallberg, Jan and Thuraisingham, Bhavani, ‘Cyber Operations: Bridging from Concept to Cyber Superiority’, Joint Force Quarterly, Vol.68, no.1, January 2013,


global middle east house would arm syrian rebels

The west has historically not been good at picking the winner in the Middle East; take its backing of Saddam in the 1980, the Shah in the 1970s, or the mujahideen in Afghanistan. All have either lost power or turned on those who supported them. If we back the wrong group in Syria then we end upon a worse position than backing none at all; the west is already perceived as being pro Sunni and is seen as being partisan rather than attempting to build a broad inclusive democracy for all communities. [1] So backing any group simply undermines longer term western aims to create a democracy.  [1] Yacoubian, Mona, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013


It is in the national interest for democracies to support those seeking to oust dictators  Democracies should support moderate groups seeking to oust dictators because the result will hopefully be a moderate, democratic state. This would then be a reliable partner for the future that would be more willing to help engage and resolve the region's problems. But this is not all about being high minded and wanting to promote democracy in the Middle East, arms need to be provided in order to ensure future influence in Syria. We already know that there are jihadis operating in Syria so it is plain that this is a conflict that will eventually have wider implications for the west. If we want to have influence in Syria after Assad is overthrown then we need to begin helping opposition groups. It is in our interest to build up the moderate groups so as to deny support to the extremists; once this is over we would be in a much better position if we have grateful friends on the ground rather than groups who are resentful that we provided fine words but no real help. We don't want to find ourselves having to root out terrorists from the air using UAVs. [1]  [1] Hokayem, Emile, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013


And what happens to these weapons afterwards? Air defensive systems that can destroy Syrian jets could pose an equal risk to Israeli or western warplanes. While Israel was surprised by Hezbollah's use of anti tank systems that did not stop the Israeli army from ultimately prevailing in the conflict so there is little reason to believe that 'evening the odds' will really alter the outcome of the conflict.


Diplomacy is not going anywhere  The best solution would be a ceasefire between the two sides in the Syrian civil war and a negotiated settlement, but it is clear we are long past the point where this approach stood a chance of success. The United Nations peace effort under Kofi Annan failed in the middle of last year [1] and there has been no progress since. Similarly all attempts to bring pressure to bear throughout the security council have failed as a result of Russia supporting Assad's regime. This leaves the unilateral initiatives to help the rebels. No state wants full intervention as France did in Mali [2] so the only alternative is simply to help the Free Syrian Army. To do so means providing what they need to win the conflict; primarily arms that can defeat the Syrian army. This need not be considered to be exclusive with diplomacy; the intervening state should continue to try to find a diplomatic solution just as before the Dayton accords NATO helped the Croats militarily while at the same time looking to diplomacy to provide an overall solution to the conflict. [3]  [1] Plett, Barbara, ‘Syria crisis: Kofi Annan quits as UN-Arab League envoy’, BBC News, 2 August 2012  [2] See the debatabase debate ‘ This House believes France is right to intervene in Mali ’.  [3] Hokayem, Emile, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013


Syria clearly meets the standards for intervention  The Assad regime has clearly lost its legitimacy and has precipitated a humanitarian crisis in Syria. The February estimate of 70000 killed [1] is up from an estimate of 60000 only a month before, [2] so clearly the violence is escalating. The conflict is also affecting neighbours; refugees have flooded into Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, and Israel is already believed to have attacked a convoy or research facility involved in chemical and biological weapons development. [3] Clearly the presence of these weapons show how much worse the situation could get if Assad is not overthrown. Not intervening risks the whole region being slowly destabilised and drawn in to the conflict. [4]  [1] Nichols, Michelle, ‘Syria death toll likely near 70,000, says U.N. rights chief’, Reuters, 12 Feb 2012  [2] ‘Data suggests Syria death toll could be more than 60,000, says UN human rights office’, UN News Centre, 2 January 2013  [3] ‘Q&A: Israeli ‘strike’ on Syria’, BBC News, 3 February 2013  [4] Byman, Daniel, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013


The if the rebels are armed and the regime gets close to losing surely it will simply increase the bloodshed and have greater motive to use its chemical and biological weapons. Therefore arming either side simply increases the potential for killing. A balance of death is not what anyone should be looking for in Syria.


Simply because there is stalemate in diplomacy and on the ground does not make arming the rebels the option that should now be taken, indeed it does not mean that outside powers need to take any action at all. Those with Syria's best interests at heart would remain on the sidelines, provide humanitarian assistance, and encourage new diplomatic initiatives. The response should not be to turn Syria into a rerun of the proxy wars of the Cold War with the west arming be side and Russia the other.


Balance in this case would not be a good thing as this would simply mean a much longer continuation of a bloody civil war. The longer the conflict continues the more difficult it is to put Syria back together again when peace finally does arrive.


The Free Syrian Army is outgunned  The Syrian army is one of the biggest armies in the world; it is nothing like the poorly equipped Libyan army that was beaten by western backed rebels in 2011. The government has aircraft, and helicopters that are used to bomb the rebels, and heavy Russian built tanks that are impervious to most of the small arms the free Syrian army has. Providing arms would quickly even the odds; light anti-tank weapons would be effective against Syrian armoured vehicles repeating the success with which Hezbollah employed them when they knocked out sixty Israeli armoured vehicles in 2006, [1] while man portable air defence systems would quickly make the skies too dangerous for the Syrian airforce so protecting free Syrian controlled areas from the threat of attack from the air. [2]  [1] Cordesman, Anthony H., ‘Preliminary “Lessons” of the Israeli-Hezbollah War’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 August 2006, P.18  [2] Doran, Michael, and Shaikh, Salman, ‘Arm the Syrian Rebels. Now’. Foreign Policy, 8 February 2013


Would balance the support for Syrian government  Syria's government has been receiving outside support from a variety of sources; Russia and Iran being the most prominent. Iran has been training the Jaysh al- Shabi, a Syrian government-controlled force modelled on Iran's Basij militia. Far from just providing weapons, both Iran and Hezbollah from Lebanon have been sending fighters to support the Syrian government. [1] The rebels have received some support for Qatar and Saudi Arabia but not to the extent the Syrian government has. Anyone with an interest in the free Syrian cause should realise that they cannot do so simply by sitting on their hands expecting a victory when those doing the fighting are only provided diplomatic support.  [1] Doran, Michael, and Shaikh, Salman, ‘Arm the Syrian Rebels. Now’. Foreign Policy, 8 February 2013


This is a pointless argument; the consequences of inaction are just unknowable. Doing nothing could lead to exactly the same consequences. Alternatively arming the moderates could speed the end to the civil war and the creation of a democratic state.


This makes the assumption that the Assad government is considered the legitimate authority within Syria, the Russians accept this, but other countries are less sure. Both the US and UK now recognise the Syrian opposition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people [1] which would mean arming them would be legal in the same way that the Russians consider arming Assad to be internationally legal.  [1] Malas, Nour, and Solomon, Jay, ‘U.S. Formally Recognizes Syria’s Main Rebel Group’, The Wall Street Journal, 12 December 2012


Arming the rebels would be unpopular  Ten years after the Iraq war interventions in the Middle East are no more popular than they were back in 2003. Getting involved in Syria would not be popular no matter how small the commitment. In the United States voters oppose the idea of supplying arms to Syrian rebels by 45% against to only 16% in favour, in the United Kingdom opinion is even more opposed; while there are still 16% in favour there are 57% opposed. [1] Clearly arming the rebels would not be popular with voters - there can therefore be no domestic reason for this policy.  [1] Clark, Tom, ‘US and UK public reject stronger military support for Syrian rebels’, guardian.co.uk, 22 March 2013


Would it work?  The most fundamental question for any policy is whether it would actually work if implemented? In this case it seems to be doubtful that in practice arming the rebels would be enough to allow them to prevail. It will simply be helping to even the odds; providing enough arms to prevail over a fully equipped army that is supplied by Iran and Russia would require a truly colossal effort. No one is seriously going to consider providing M1 Abrams tanks to overcome Syrian armour when there are even concerns about providing anti-aircraft missiles. Even supporters of arming the rebels such as Senator John McCain say "this alone will not be decisive". All arming the rebels does then is make the government appear to be doing something (in a bad way since it is an unpopular policy), and stick a toe in the water (also bad as that may lead to escalating commitments), and another decision point six months down the line. [1]  [1] Lynch, Marc, ‘Shopping Option C for Syria’, Foreign Policy, 14 February 2013


Possibility of being drawn into a long drawn out conflict  Even just providing the rebels with arms risks drawing the powers that supply those arms into the conflict. [1] This is because it gives the intervening power a stake in the conflict. Once weapons have been supplied allowing the Syrian government to reassert control would be a large foreign policy reversal and would damage relations with the Syrian government for years to come.  We need only look at the Vietnam conflict to know that what starts out as a very small commitment can rapidly escalate when the government decides it cannot afford to back down. What starts as just arming the rebels could quickly lead to troops on the ground. Indeed it might require men on the ground right from the start as if we were to be providing heavy weapons the rebels would need training in how to use those weapons if they are to seriously be considered an equaliser.  [1] Byman, Daniel, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013


Unforeseeable consequences  We do not know where arming the rebels will lead. The most obvious parallel has to be Afghanistan in the 1980s where the United States armed the mujahideen and succeeded in their objective of damaging the USSR through a war of attrition much as the US had suffered in Vietnam. Afghanistan became an albatross around the Soviet Union’s neck. [1] But the US did not win the peace, Afghanistan descended into civil conflict which had a Taliban victory that sheltered Osama bin Laden; US arms in Afghanistan unintentionally lead more than a decade later to September 11. In this case we would be arming a movement that has many jihadi elements that could end up with the weaponry. Other countries such as Turkey are also worried about where powerful weapons such as anti aircraft missiles could end up if provided to the rebels. They fear they could easily find their way across the border to militant Kurds. [2] Other paths that this could lead to are just as bad; for example helping the Libyan rebels lead to the conflict in Mali. [3] In this case the short term consequences could be just as bad. Arming the Sunnis could provoke retaliation from either Iran or Hezbollah who could feel undermined by the move, in the worst case scenario they could even attack western assets in the area. [4]  [1] Hoffman, David E., The Dead Hand: Reagan, Gorbachev and the Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race, Icon Books Ltd, 2011, p.211  [2] Hokayem, Emile, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013  [3] Jones, Owen, ‘The war in Libya was seen as a success, now here we are engaging with the blowback in Mali’, The Independent, 13 January 2013  [4] Yacoubian, Mona, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013


We cannot know whether this policy will work until it is tried. The Free Syrian Army has been remarkably successful so far capturing large swathes of the country and taking the fight to the regime in the capital Damascus. [1] With more sophisticated weaponry to naturalise the tanks, warplanes, helicopters of the regime the Free Syrians may well be able to finish the job.  [1] BBC News, ‘Syria: Mapping the insurgency’, 4 December 2012


Sovereignty and non intervention in internal affairs  It is a clear international rule that nations are sovereign and other states are simply not allowed to be making interventions into another country’s domestic affairs. The UN Charter emphasises “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”. [1] Within a state only the government is legitimate as the supreme authority within its territory. [2] This is to prevent the bigger and richer powers from doing exactly this sort of thing to obtain the result they want inside another country. This is why Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated "International law does not permit the supply of arms to non-governmental actors and our point of view is that it is a violation of international law," in response to suggestions that the UK would arm the Syrian rebels. [3]  [1] UN General Assembly, Article 2, Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945  [2] Philpott, Dan, "Sovereignty", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)  [3] Abbas, Mohammed, ‘Russia says arming Syrian opposition would be illegal’, Reuters, 13 March 2013


The strategic situation in Syria is nothing like that which meant the US felt it could not withdraw from Vietnam. There is no line of 'dominos' that could be knocked over in a row as a result of a victory by the Syrian government. Far from it, some of Syria's neighbours like Jordan may be strengthened by a government victory as it would halt the momentum of protest against rulers in the region. There is also no large scale outside power that would take advantage of Syrian government victory as was the case with the USSR in the Cold War. In this case such a result would mean a return to the status quo, not something the west would desire, but hardly a strategic disaster so cutting losses if the policy does not work would be comparatively easy.


Public opinion is not the decider of what is right and wrong in foreign policy; people are rarely in favour of any kind of action in a volatile international situation. Had public opinion been the decider the allies would have rolled over and let Poland be taken in World War II.


africa global house believes former colonial powers should pay reparations

This proposition line does not lead to a situation where developing countries forgive their colonisers and forget the suffering of the past; rather, it will lead to a situation where they identify those colonial forces as the source of their suffering, but also as the power which tried to undermine their human integrity by paying them off. Such developing countries will always view reparations as ‘insufficient compensation’ [1] , because there is no lump sum on money which can atone for the acts and atrocities committed against human life. This motion is not only ineffective but will exacerbate the current situation by portraying the West as a place where money has a higher value than the human lives of developing countries; as such, there is no reason for former colonies to believe that their have gained any status other then an ‘opportunity’ for the West.  [1] Accessed from  on 12/09/11


Reparations would be a step towards closing colonial scars.  It is difficult for former colonies to feel as if they can move on and develop a wholly independent identity when their ties to the past, and to their former colonisers, have not been definitively ended. For example, while it is important to remember those who suffered under slavery, the overwhelming memory of it [1] overpowers the history of those countries and innately links them back to former colonial powers. Furthermore, many of the problems now faced by former colonies can be traced back to the actions of colonial-era masters, for example the birth of ethnic tensions between minorities in Rwanda [2] and Burundi [3] . In order to move on from that damaging legacy, and to conclusively prove that such prejudices are always wrong, it is necessary for former colonial powers to show a tangible move towards closing that colonial chapter of their history. In this way they can begin to move towards a fresh, equal and co-operative relationship with the developing countries which were their former colonies, without the background of history which currently warps such relationships. Italy’s payment of reparations to Libya [4] allowed Libya to ‘mend fences with the West’ [5] and to improve international relationships. This is a step to recognise developing countries as a nation, rather than an economic opportunity. In this way, reparations would be an effective way of demonstrating a global community and spirit.  [1] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [2] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [3] Accessed from  on 12/09/11.  [4] Time. ‘Italy Pays Reparations to Libya’. Published 02/09/2008. Accessed from  on 12/09/11.  [5] Accessed from  on 12/09/11


These reparations have done little to satisfy the recipient countries. For example, Israel asked Germany to improve the reparations agreement [1] , which resulted in Germany withdrawing reparations entirely [2] and only served to increase tensions between the two nations. Furthermore, Israel has become reliant on German reparation money [3] , suggesting that reparations do not in fact allow the recipient country to develop their whole national identity without ties to former dominating countries. Moreover, despite the payment of reparations from Italy to Libya, Libya still believes that it was ‘insufficient compensation for colonial damages’ [4] . Just because reparations have been made in the past does not, by any means, show that they were successful or indeed that they are the best option available in the present day.  [1] Accessed from  on 12/09/11.  [2] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [3] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [4] Accessed from  on 12/09/11


Reparations demonstrate a true concern for the developing world.  Even alongside the colonial justifications for providing reparations, there are also many other strong reasons why former colonial powers should grant reparations. Former colonial powers tend to be economically developed, like America, Britain and France. The developed world should recognise the dire poverty and social challenges fed by the developing world today. Giving aid as an act of charity can sometimes be seen as derogatory [1] , and is even rejected by the potential recipients [2] [3] [4] . However, reparations allows a transfer of wealth between these countries in a way which is sensitive to the history between them, and which also demonstrates a desire to improve their relationship. It allows aid to be given to the developing world in a means which is dignified but not spurious.  [1] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [2] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [3] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [4] Accessed from  on 12/09/11


What happened during the colonial era was morally wrong.  The entire basis for colonisation was predicated on an innate ‘understanding’ and judgment of one superior culture and race [1] . This ethnocentric approach idolised western traditions while simultaneously undermining the traditions of the countries which were colonised. For example, during the colonisation of America, colonists imposed a Westernised school system on Native American children. This denied their right to wear traditional clothing [2] or to speak their native language [3] , and the children were often subject to physical and sexual abuse and forced labour [4] . The cause of this was simply ignorance of culture differences on behalf of the colonists, which was idyllically labelled and disguised as ‘The White Man’s Burden’ [5] . Colonial powers undermined the social and property rights [6] of the colonies, using military force to rule if civilians should rebel against colonisation in countries such as India [7] . After Indian fighters rebelled against British colonial force in the Indian Mutiny of 1857-58 [8] , the British struck back with terrible force, and forced the rebels to ‘lick up part of the blood’ from the floors of the houses [9] . The actions which occurred during colonisation are considered completely inappropriate and undesirable behaviour in a modern world, and in terms of indigenous rights to culture and to property, as well as human rights more generally. Reparations would be a meaningful act of apology for the wrongs which were committed during the past.  [1] Accessed from  on 11/09/11  [2] Accessed from  on 11/09/11  [3] Accessed from  on 11/09/11  [4] Accessed from  on 11/09/11  [5] Accessed from  on 11/09/11  [6] Accessed from  on 11/09/11  [7] Accessed from  on 11/09/11.  [8] Accessed from  on 11/09/11  [9] Accessed from  on 11/09/11


This is a very one-sided assertion of past events. It was not only the colonists who acted in an unacceptable manner; for example, during the Indian Mutiny, a party of sepoys ‘execute[d] the 210 women and children’ with guns and knives [1] . Some, though horribly wounded, remained alive until morning [2] . History is very complex; while there were certainly atrocious events, it is unfair and untrue to apportion blame to only one party – namely, the colonists. In any case, in the face of such atrocities, it is completely superficial to imagine that mere money could wipe the slate clean. Reparations are used to correct a past wrong [3] ; it would be derogatory to assume that we can pay people off for acts such as these, and that they require no more hindsight or consideration.  [1] Accessed from  on 11/09/11  [2] Accessed from  on 11/09/11  [3] Accessed from  on 11/09/11


Disguising the purely economic balance illustrated here as a demonstration of heartfelt regret undermines the principles outlined by previous proposition arguments. This is, in fact, a hollow gesture – one that is disguised as a reparation to overcome a country’s right (though we may not agree with it) to reject the aid which is offered to them. The rejection of aid is a demonstrative action in itself; it sends a message that the recipient country does not wish to associate themselves with the donor country. By trying to use reparations as a loophole, this concept simultaneously criticised the recipient country’s right to choose whether they receive aid or not, and undermines the value of reparations elsewhere as a genuine gesture.


Most of the Western world is currently undergoing a financial crisis [1] . However prosperous these former colonies might have been, in the modern world they simply do not have the money to provide reparations to these countries on any scale which might come close to closing the economic gap between them. America’s enormous debt almost caused a complete economic collapse in August [2] ; Britain was struggling under £2252.9 billion of debt as on July 2011 [3] . The proposition’s naive balancing argument fails to take into account the realities of the economy and debt in raising this motion – it would be impossible to achieve.  [1] The Telegraph. ‘Double-dip fears across West as confidence crumbles’. Published on 30/09/2011. Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [2] BBC. ‘IMF calls for US to raise debt ceiling and cut spending’. Published 25/07/2011. Accessed at  on 12/09/11  [3] Accessed from  on 12/09/11


There is already a precedent for paying reparations to such states.  In the past, dominating global powers have paid reparations and compensation for historical wrongs. For example, Germany pays an annual amount of money to Israel to recognise wrongs committed against Jews during the Holocaust, and to recognise the theft of Jewish property at this time [1] . These reparations have helped Israeli infrastructure enormously, providing ‘railways and telephones, dock installations and irrigation plants, whole areas of industry and agriculture’ [2] and contributing to Israeli economic security. Japan also paid reparations to Korea after World War II as the Koreans were ‘deprived of their nation and their identity’ [4] . Britain has paid compensation to the New Zealand Maoris for the damage done during colonial times and the seizure of their land [5] , and Iraq pays compensation to Kuwait for damage done during the invasion and occupation of 1990-91 [6] . There is little reason why other nations should not be paid for the grievances caused to them by domination countries. There is support for the notion that colonial powers should pay for free universal education in Africa [7] ; this would be an entirely appropriate and desirable measure.  [1] 'Holocaust Restitution: German Reparations', Jewish Virtual Library, accessed 16/1/2014,   [2] 'Holocaust Restitution: German Reparations', Jewish Virtual Library, accessed 16/1/2014,   [4] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [5] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [6] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [7] Accessed from  on 12/09/11


Reparations would effectively right the economic imbalance caused by colonialism.  Given that much of the motive for colonisation was economic, many former colonies have suffered damage to their natural resources [1] or human resources, [2] which has left them less able to sustain a healthy economy. Colonists targeted countries with rich natural resources and little ability to defend themselves from invasion and manipulation. By this method, they could supply their own markets with the natural resources which they had already exploited at home [3] , and find cheap (or free) human labour for their markets [4] . Given that powerful countries such as Britain [5] and France [6] gained their own economic prosperity through the exploitation of the economic potential of the colonies, it is entirely appropriate and logical that they should pay reparations as compensation. In this way, the economic disparity between former colonies and colonists would be equalised.  [1] Accessed from  on12/09/11  [2] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [3] Accessed from  12/09/11  [4] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [5] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [6] ‘The Haitian Revolution and its Effects’. Patrick E. Bryan. Accessed from  on 12/09/11.


Taxpayers already fund the foreign aid which is distributed habitually [1] [2] ; they are not to blame for a famine in Somalia, for example, but they continue to pay for it [3] . There is frequently a disconnection between the people who pay for aid and the people who receive it. However, we recognise that the need is great enough in such countries to make it not only legitimate, but a moral duty. Most citizens of former colonial powers can recognise that some of the acts committed during colonial times was wrong and deserves repairing. Given that this is a productive means of doing so, and already has the precedent of foreign aid more generally, it is entirely appropriate.  [1] The Daily Mail. ‘Foreign aid budget to cost every family £500’. Published 22/10/2010. Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [2] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [3] BBC. ‘Somalia famine: UK insists aid is “getting through”’. Published 18/08/2011. Accessed from  on 12/09/11


Given that many former colonies remain poor (even after so many years), it is very unlikely that these people would have no need for such money. The difference in timescale is irrelevant; what is relevant is that such former colonies have a demonstrated need for this money, and that atrocities occurred during the colonial era. If it became to hard to track down specific people, it would also be easily possible to give money to the government as Italy did to Libya [1] , in which case the potential for improved infrastructure and basic living conditions could have a nation-wide benefit. Just because it may be difficult does not overrule the many powerful arguments that we should do this.  [1] Accessed from  on 12/09/11


Such reparations would do little to actually improve the developing countries.  Reparations are an incredibly short-term economic measure. To have any substantial impact, long-term systems would need to be put in place to truly benefit such countries, and it would be far better to encourage sustainable growth [1] than a one-off bumper payment. Developed countries should look towards improving their long-term relationship with former colonies and establishing measures such as fairer trade rules or debt relief as an efficient measure. This would allow the aid to be focused in the places where these countries need it most.  The symbolism of reparations is also potentially dangerous. Firstly, paying reparations may bring the belief that former colonial powers have ‘paid their debt’ and no longer have to seek to improve their own conduct of foreign policy. Secondly, this measure would allow dictators such as Robert Mugabe to feel justified in their declarations that colonial powers are independently responsible for all the problems affecting their countries [2] [3] [4] . In this way, Mugabe tries to hide his own shortcomings and place blame entirely on the West, which has negative impacts on the potential for international relations. In the case of Italy’s reparations to Libya, this could be seen as strengthening the Gaddafi dictatorship at the expense of the Libyan people and the West, particularly as Gaddafi is prone to blaming the West [5] or indeed anybody else he can [6] .  [1] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [2] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [3] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [4] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [5] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [6] Accessed from  on 12/09/11


The very payment of reparations exerts a neo-colonial power over former colonies.  The recognition that many former colonies are in desperate economic need only adds to the sense that former colonial powers desire to hold sway over them. Giving reparations induces dependency and can weaken the appearance of government in the former colonies, and may allow the donor government to exert influence over policy areas within the recipient country [1] . Far from giving the recipient country the means to develop itself as an independent nation, this motion simply recalls the old power structure which existed during colonisation.  [1] Accessed from  on 12/09/11


Reparations unfairly target the taxpayers of former colonial powers who had nothing to do with the deeds committed under colonisation.  It is unclear who exactly is being punished under this mechanism. Ordering reparations rather than, for example, a public apology from a monarch or government, only serves to harm tax-paying citizens whose money would be used to pay such reparations. There is a huge disconnection between the people who actually committed wrongs and the people who are now forced to literally pay for them. This is likely to lead to an increase in hostility from the taxpayers who do not understand why they are being punished, towards the people of former colonies. It is no longer a case where reparations could ever be paid from the direct profits of exploitation as any profit from that must have been spent long ago. It is wrong to impose undue guilt and obligation of payment on to people who are entirely disconnected from that history.


Time has removed the opportunity to truly make reparations to those who may have deserved it.  Reparations are used to make ‘amends for wrong or injury done’ [1] ; it is impossible to truly achieve this when the victims of wrongdoing are long since dead. Moreover, reparations which may have been made immediately after colonisation could have had a specific purpose – for example, to rebuild property which was destroyed, or to restore items which were wrongfully taken. However, the development of both countries has led to a very different state of affairs in both, and there may no longer be an obvious end for the money from reparations. There is also no precedent for giving reparations to countries after so long a period of time. For example, Germany began paying reparations to Israel in 1952 [2] , only 7 years after World War II ended in 1945. Time also makes it very difficult to judge who the ‘victims’ are now. The descendants of original victims may well be independently wealthy now – would it be right to financially cripple of Western country and their people, already suffering from economic depression, to pay people who may not need it now? In any case, it would take a very long to even work out how we could pay reparations, let alone whether we should.  [1] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [2] Accessed from  on 12/09/11


There is a fundamental difference here between colonisation and the modern day; whereas colonial powers were formerly damaging infrastructure [1] and natural resources [2] , in the modern day under reparations they would be helping to preserve such resources and finance the development of a sound infrastructure. Nor would the former colonial powers be exerting military strength [3] [4] [5] . There is an obvious difference between the relations of a colonial power and its colony, and a developed nation offering reparations to a less developed nation. One notable change is that the flow of money has changed direction – instead of exploiting the economic potential of the colony, the developed country is actually giving money to the former colony. This opposition point simply does not stand  [1] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [2] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [3] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [4] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [5] Accessed from  on 12/09/11


It is entirely possible that reparations could be paid in smaller instalments over a much longer term as Germany has done [1] , thereby providing a longer-term solution rather than one lump sum. Furthermore, it is likely that if former colonial powers offer reparations as a genuine attempt to accept and apologise for the wrongs previously committed, the longer-term relationship between the two countries would be eased. Finally, it is at least more likely that citizens in countries such as Zimbabwe and Libya might re-think their opinion of the West if reparations and help were offered, rather than blankly refused. While the dictators may continue to denounce the West, it will be harder for them to do so if former colonial powers show every attempt to help and communicate with the people they have wronged.  [1] Rising, David, 'Germany increases reparations for Holocaust survivors', Times of Israel, 16 November 2012,


global politics society minorities house believes south ossetia should be

Georgia's government is democratic and modern in its institutions. It is fully capable and intent on governing S. Ossetia democratically and honestly. Moreover, if the aim of the S. Osseitans' is to join with Russia, upon seceding from Georgia (as seems likely), then the many arguments it is putting forward in support of its national identity and right to self-determination do not apply in the same way, as they would be simply exchanging minority status in one state for minority status in another, and not truly seeking their own homeland where Ossets would be a majority, as they claim. This means that arguments about Ossetian being its own language and the Ossets having a long history of self-rule are not in fact arguments for secession, as secession would simply result in a transfer to Russia and not a truly Ossetian state. Therefore, the real question is: does Georgia or Russia have a greater claim to S. Ossetia as part of its territory? The historical arguments made by proposition clearly should Georgia to have a greater claim here.


Georgian rule in South Ossetia is historically illegitimate and oppressive  Modern Georgia never really controlled S. Ossetia. South Ossetia declared independence from Georgia shortly after Georgia gained independence from the disintegrating USSR in 1991. South Ossetia has maintained de facto independence ever since. [1] Georgia, therefore, cannot really claim to have had sustained, legitimate sovereign control over South Ossetia in modern times. Even the USSR recognised S. Ossetia as distinct from Georgia, with the Kremlin stating in 1920 that “we consider that Ossetia should have the power it prefers. Georgian intrusion into affairs of Ossetia would be an unjustified intervention into foreign internal affairs”. [2] S. Ossetia was an autonomous region within the USSR. It was not considered part of the same region that is now Georgia, and thus during its years under the USSR, S. Ossetia built up a significant degree of autonomy and independence in its internal functioning. Therefore, Georgia's only real claim to South Ossetia must extend back nearly a century, before the time of the Soviet Union.  This significantly weakens Georgia's claim over South Ossetia, but moreover Georgia's historical claim on South Ossetia is quite weak even in isolation. This is because S. Ossetia has its own distinct language and history to that of Georgia. Ossetian or Ossetic is a member of the Northeastern Iranian branch of Indo-European languages. About 500,000 people speak Ossetian in Ossetia. [3] , [4] That Ossetia has this distinct language is an important fact in favour of its status as a nation-state and in favor of its independence. Georgia, however, has been accused of committing genocide against the South Ossetians in 1920, 1993, and 2008, with tens of thousands of S. Ossetians dying over the course of these conflicts. [5] The Georgian government has also attempted to suppress S. Ossetian culture and identity, for example banning the use of the Ossetian language in official documents and abolishing S. Ossetian autonomy within Georgia. [6] Georgian rule in S. Ossetia is therefore both ahistorical, due to S. Ossetia's long and recognised history of independence and cultural and linguistic distinctness, and illegitimate, as the Georgian government has waged war upon the very lives and identity of the S. Ossetian people.  [1] BBC News. “S Ossetia votes for independence”. BBC News. 13 November 2006.   [2] Bzarov, Ruslan. “Independence of the Republic of South Ossetia – a guarantee of safety and reliable future of the Ossetian people”. Speech of Doctor of historical sciences, Professor Ruslan Bzarov at the VI congress of the Ossetian people. September 2007.   [3] BBC News. “S Ossetia votes for independence”. BBC News. 13 November 2006.   [4] Omniglot. “Ossetian”. Omniglot.   [5] Portyakova, Natalya and Sysoyev, Gennady. “Measuring South Ossetia by Kosovo”. Kommersant. 15 November 2006.   [6] Makarkin, Alexei. “How is South Ossetia different from Kosovo?”. RIA Novosti. 9 March 2006.


If S. Ossetians renounce violence, no future conflicts will occur. S. Ossetian militant separatists argue that, if S. Ossetia is not given independence, that future violence and chaos will result. Yet, this is only the case if S. Ossetian separatists continue to resist Georgia's sovereignty violently. If S. Ossetians renounce the use of force and their separatism, there will be no future conflicts. This is an equally valid solution as independence. Furthermore, the US State Department rejected the 2006 independence referendum and warned that it would “only serve to exacerbate tensions and divert attention from the need to peacefully resolve the conflict.” [1]  [1] The Georgian Times Online. “US slams separatists' decision”. The Georgian Times. 9 November 2006.


South Ossetia has a right to self-determination  The 1993 Vienna Declaration, which reaffirmed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter (and so sets the standard in current international law), unequivocally gives all peoples the right to self-determination: "All people have the right to self-determination. Owing to this right they freely establish their political status and freely provide their economic, social and cultural development...World Conference on Human Rights considers refusal of the right to self-determination as a violation of human rights and emphasizes the necessity of effective realization of this right". [1]  By this measure, South Ossetia has the right to self-determination (by democratic processes), and any suppression of that right should be seen as a human rights violation. In 2006, South Ossetia held a referendum that found over 99% of its population of over 100,000 desire independence from Georgia. 95% of the population turned out to vote. The referendum was monitored by a team of 34 international observers. [2] These facts are the core of the case for South Ossetian independence. It demonstrates that South Ossetians are entirely unified and enthusiastic in their desire for independence. The strength and unity of these calls for independence are almost unprecedented and cannot be ignored by the international community. And, certainly, the percentage of a population that desires independence is of relevance to assessing the legitimacy of the call and a country's right to self-determination. By this standard, South Ossetia's right to self-determination is highly legitimate.  [1] United Nations World Conference on Human Rights. “VIENNA DECLARATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION”. United Nations. 14-25 June 1993.   [2] BBC News. “S Ossetia votes for independence”. BBC News. 13 November 2006.


Self-determination is not an absolute right. Not every territory and region in the world that seeks independence has the right to it. This is due in no small part to the fact that such a system would be unworkable. Certain criteria must be met for a territory and people to obtain a legitimate right to self-determination (for example, viability as an independent state and an authentic internal drive for independence), and S. Ossetia arguably does not meet many of these criteria. Therefore S. Ossetia possesses no absolute right to self-determination, and its calls for independence must be evaluated in the context of what the consequences of independence would be. Furthermore, no countries recognized South Ossetia's 2006 referendum and vote for independence at the time it was carried out, and few do now. Without such approval, the referendum should be considered illegitimate. The European human rights watchdog, the Council of Europe, denounced the referendum as "unnecessary, unhelpful and unfair". [1]  [1] Walker, Shaun. “South Ossetia: Russian, Georgian...independent?”. Open Democracy. 15 November 2006.


South Ossetian independence will help prevent future conflict  The status quo in the region is one of militarized clashes and tensions. It is important to recognize that South Ossetia has been de facto independent for some time. If it does not achieve independence, the proposed alternative is that it re-integrate into Georgia. Yet, of South Ossetians have made it clear that they will not accept this. The only possible course of action, therefore, would be to force over 100,000 South Ossetians to live under the tyranny of the majority of the Georgian state. This would not only be a clear violation of self-determination and basic democratic principles, but it would also risk a protracted war or insurgency in S. Ossetia against any re-assertion of Georgian authority. S. Ossetia and Georgia have been battling each other for over a century. Georgia has been accused of ethnic cleansing there, and of launching a 'war of aggression' which killed a large number of S. Ossetian civilians in 2008. [1] This war, as the culmination of Georgian aggression against S. Osstia, has made finally made any sort of reconciliation between the two impossible, and hardened S. Ossetian desires for independence. Keeping S. Ossetia within Georgia will simply prolong this ethic struggle, which has demonstrated itself to be irreconcilable in the foreseeable future. This conflict could easily draw in other powers (such as Russia) and cause a wider war once again. Granting S. Ossetian independence, therefore, would help avoid future conflicts and their awful humanitarian consequences.  [1] Walker, Shaun. “South Ossetia: Russian, Georgian...independent?”. Open Democracy. 15 November 2006.


It is invalid to criticize S. Ossetia's referendum for risking instability. The US State Department as well as the European Union both argued that the South Ossetia referendum was wrong on the basis that it was “unhelpful” and could exacerbate tensions with Georgia. [1] This, however, is an invalid status quo argument. It posits that any vote taken by the South Ossetians that disrupts the status quo is invalid, while a vote that might uphold the status quote could be considered valid. This is an unprincipled argument. The South Ossetians have a right to express their beliefs, and those beliefs are legitimate and should be respected, irrespective of whether it disrupts the status quo or even leads to conflict with Georgia. And, if Georgia and other states want to maintain stability, they can do so by not reacting violently to an independent South Ossetia.  [1] The Georgian Times Online. “US slams separatists' decision”. The Georgian Times. 9 November 2006.


Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the 2006 referendum as a “free expression of the will of South Ossetia’s people through democratic procedures. Many countries in Europe and America could only envy the level of organization and democratic transparency [in South Ossetia].” [1] (10)Similarly, Luis Tascón, a member of the National Assembly of Venezuela, stated during visit to S. Ossetia that “Those people who wish to be free will be free. And the free peoples will help South Ossetia with it.” [2] (13) Denying the legitimacy of this democratic referendum (whose flaws have not been proved to have been so severe as to discredit it entirely) is to deny the South Ossetian people the right to self-determination.  [1] Socor, Vladimir. “MOSCOW’S FINGERPRINTS ALL OVER SOUTH OSSETIA’S REFERENDUM”. Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 3 Issue: 212. The Jamestown Foundation. 15 November 2006.   [2] Enotes. “South Ossetian independence referendum, 2006”. Enotes.


A South Ossetian state is unviable  There are many factors that make South Ossetia unviable as a state. South Ossetia is very small with a very small population. It is also a landlocked state and very poor. These facts make it unlikely that South Ossetia could act effectively as an independent state. The result is that it would become dependent on other states. [1] This can already be seen from the fact that S. Ossetia has only been able to secure its current de facto independence with substantial military and foreign aid from Russia. [2] S. Ossetia is economically unviable as an independent state. It is landlocked and only has meaningful road access to the sea through Georgia. S. Ossetian GDP was estimated at US$ 15 million (US$ 250 per capita) in a work published in 2002. S. Ossetia is arguably lacking in the basic economic necessities for autonomy. Indeed, a $15 million GDP would make South Ossetia one of the poorest nations in the world. Particularly following a war with Georgia in the 1990s, South Ossetia has struggled economically. Employment and supplies are scarce. The majority of the population survives on subsistence farming. Virtually the only significant economic asset that South Ossetia possesses is control of the Roki Tunnel that links Russia and Georgia, from which the South Ossetian government reportedly obtains as much as a third of its budget by levying customs duties on freight traffic. The separatist officials admitted that Tskhinvali received more than 60 percent of its 2006 budget revenue directly from the Russian government. [3] [4] Finally, S. Ossetia has a population of roughly 70,000. [5] This would make it one of the smallest states in the world. This fact, combined with its high level of poverty, makes it a poor candidate for independence, and shows that its “independence” would compel it to become even more dependent on Russia, or else risk disintegrating as an unviable state.  [1] BBC News. “S Ossetia votes for independence”. BBC News. 13 November 2006.   [2] Socor, Vladimir. “MOSCOW’S FINGERPRINTS ALL OVER SOUTH OSSETIA’S REFERENDUM”. Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 3 Issue: 212. The Jamestown Foundation. 15 November 2006.   [3] Walker, Shaun. “South Ossetia: Russian, Georgian...independent?”. Open Democracy. 15 November 2006.   [4] Vaisman, Daria. “No recognition for breakaway South Ossetia's vote”. The Christian Science Monitor. 10 November 2006.   [5] BBC News. “S Ossetia votes for independence”. BBC News. 13 November 2006.


Georgia has a right to territorial integrity  Georgia has a legitimate sovereign right to maintain its territorial integrity as well as the social contract accompanying it. Georgia has the right to take action to secure the integrity of these things, unless blocked by a higher international authority. Internationally, S. Ossetia's independence is recognised by only five nations (including Russia), demonstrating that the international community is not convinced that S. Ossetia's claim to self-determination trumps Georgia's claim to territorial integrity. [1] In order to obtain independence, it is important that a country be recognized diplomatically by a significant number of the members of the United Nations. This is important in large part because it ensures that a state will have viable diplomatic relations internationally if it becomes independent. It also demonstrates that the international system supports a certain action being taken internationally. Thus Georgia's claim should continue to stand until the international community changes its mind, and at the moment the international community has legitimate concerns regarding the regional instability and conflict that an independent S. Ossetia might foster. Moreover, as shown above the S. Ossetian state is entirely dependent on Russian support, and so it can be accurately stated that the issue of S. Ossetian independence, and its threat to Georgian territorial integrity, has arisen only because of Russian interference within Georgia. Even those who argue that any region has the right to self-determination would probably reject the idea that nations have the right to foster and encourage parts of other nations to secede from their current state and join another. The S. Ossetian independence movement can thus be correctly seen simply as Russian aggression against Georgia for its own advantage, not an issue of self-determination.  [1] RIA Novosti. “Nicaragua recognizes South Ossetia and Abkhazia”. RIA Novosti. 4 September 2008.


Illegitimacy of the 2006 referendum  South Ossetia was wrong to hold elections under conflict conditions. In 2006, South Ossetia can be said to have been in 8 conflicts with Georgia when it held its 2006 referendum on independence. Holding referendums under such conflict conditions is generally illegitimate because the results of the elections are skewed by the conflict, threats, and the various risks for the voters involved. This caused David Bakradze, the chairman of a Georgian parliamentary European Integration Committee, to comment, “Under conflict conditions, you cannot speak about legitimate elections.” [1] This mirrors European human rights watchdog, the Council of Europe’s, denunciation of the referendum as "unnecessary, unhelpful and unfair". [2] Furthermore Russia's involvement in the 2006 referendum arguably corrupted its validity, as many of the authorities in S. Ossetia were installed there by the Russian government. [3]  [1] Radio Free Europe. “Overwhelming Support For South Ossetia Independence”. Radio Free Europe. The Journal of the Turkish Weekly. 13 November 2006.   [2] Walker, Shaun. “South Ossetia: Russian, Georgian...independent?”. Open Democracy. 15 November 2006.   [3] Socor, Vladimir. “MOSCOW’S FINGERPRINTS ALL OVER SOUTH OSSETIA’S REFERENDUM”. Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 3 Issue: 212. The Jamestown Foundation. 15 November 2006.


S. Ossetia has an effective democratic government which carries out an effective control over the territory and the population. It has independent legal procedure, army and militia and security service. The state levies taxes, provides property rights and social service – public health services, provision of pensions, public safety, power and road and transport services, etc. [1] (4) All this clearly points to the viability of an independent S. Ossetian state -a fact which already exists on the ground. Or, if it wants, after independence S. Ossetia is morally within its rights to re-join with its kith-and-kin in North Ossetia, which is part of Russia. Of course, it would have to first separate from Georgia, whereupon it will have the capacity to then decide to join Russia. Moreover, few states n the world are truly self-sufficient, and there are plenty of poor landlocked countries, so in this sense S. Ossetia would not be unique. Furthermore, poverty from continual conflict is an argument to end the conflict, not against independence.  [1] Bzarov, Ruslan. “Independence of the Republic of South Ossetia – a guarantee of safety and reliable future of the Ossetian people”. Speech of Doctor of historical sciences, Professor Ruslan Bzarov at the VI congress of the Ossetian people. September 2007.


africa politics warpeace house believes african union can meet its pledge

At that rate, war in Africa is not going to be ended by 2020. Moreover, progress in the past does not mean that the progress will continue into the future.


Progress in ending conflict in Africa  Conflict in Africa is slowly being ended. In 1992 there were 18 conflicts in Africa; by 2009 this had been halved to 9. [1] But a decline in the number of conflicts is not the only positive trend in African conflicts: there has also been a decline in the size of wars. They have changed from wars between two organised armies to being small scale insurgencies. In 1984 the conflicts were on average causing more than 20,000 battle deaths per year, but by 2008 only around 1,000. Even the number of incidents of genocide and mass killing has been going down from 9 in the 1980s to five in the 2000s. [2] Ending war might therefore be considered to be ambitious but it is not against the trend and not inconceivable.  [1] Straus, 2012, pp.183-184  [2] Straus, 2012, pp.189-191


Increasing the number of peacekeeping missions does not always mean that the result will be peace; clearly if there is a need for peacekeeping or even more so combat troops then peace has broken down. The United Nations has almost 70,000 peacekeepers deployed in Africa ,yet new conflicts and crises keep erupting; in 2013 there were new conflicts in Mali, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic. In the case of Southern Sudan this is despite there being 7500 UN peacekeepers in the country. [1]  [1] Raghavan, Sudarsan, ‘Record number of U.N. peacekeepers fails to stop African wars’, Washington Post, 4 January 2014,


The Solemn Declaration  The Solemn Declaration did not just highlight the goal but also that it would be achieved through three techniques: by 1, addressing the causes of conflicts – economic and social disparities, strengthening judicial systems to ensure accountability, and reaffirming collective responsibility, 2, preventing emerging sources of conflict such as piracy getting a foothold, and 3, engaging in conflict prevention. [1]  Africa has been building the African Peace and Security Architecture to address these causes of conflict. It has created the Peace and Security Council that facilitates the AU’s response to crises; it can engage in actions from humanitarian assistance to military intervention if there are particularly grave circumstances such as genocide. [2] When it does authorise action, this action is coordinated by the AU commission. When it comes to peaceful resolution of conflict, the AU has a ‘Panel of the Wise’ made up of former presidents and others with lots of influence and moral authority who use preventative diplomacy to try to resolve conflicts. [3]  [1] African Union, 2013, p.5  [2] Williams, Paul D., ‘The African Union’s Conflict Management Capabilities’, Council on Foreign Relations, October 2011,  , p.7  [3] Ibid, p.12


Having a system is useless if it is not sufficiently funded to fulfil its objectives, at the moment the AU does not provide sufficient funding for peacekeeping. [1]  Moreover, reaction does not prevent war - just shortens it and reduces the intensity. The Panel of the Wise is one method of attempting to stop conflict before it becomes really violent but external mediators can only do so much in preventing conflict; most needs to come from the parties in conflict.  [1] Williams, 2011, p.12


Fiddling around with what is considered to be a war is not resolving the problem of conflict in Africa. The most devastating conflicts have been internal conflicts – if we want to end war in Africa we need to prevent these conflicts from occurring too.


The increasing effectiveness of the African Union  The African Union has been taking a much more active stance in preventing and resolving conflict. Since 2003 responsibility for peace in Africa has been with the Peace and Security Council. This body has authorised AU interventions in Somalia, Sudan, Burundi, and the Central African Republic. [1] The African Union is not the only organisation engaged in peacekeeping; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has also been actively engaged in peacekeeping, having been deployed in numerous conflicts since the 1990s, most recently in Mali where they took part alongside French forces in defeating an Islamist insurgency. [2]  The AU is also boosting its collective capacity to respond to crises creating the African Standby Force made up of five regional brigades of 4000 soldiers. This force, when complete, will enable rapid deployment anywhere in Africa so helping to prevent crises becoming full scale wars. [3]  [1] ‘Peace and Security Council’, peaceau.org, 23 July 2013,   [2] News24, ‘Ecowas urges members to send troops to Mail’, 23 October 2013,   [3] Cilliers, Jakkie, ‘The African Standby Force An update on progress’, Institute of Strategic Studies, March 2008,


Not all conflict is war  What is War? The AU’s declaration does not define it. Ending all conflict is ambitious, ending only inter state war in Africa on the other hand is not. The vast majority of conflicts in Africa have been internal. The only true inter state conflicts have been the wars between Israel and Egypt, the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, the Uganda-Tunisia war, and the Second Congo War. [1] None of these are ongoing. The only conflicts that might count as inter-state that might be considered ongoing are the situation in Western Sahara and border clashes between the Sudans. Western Sahara might be considered to be frozen with very few deaths as a result of it and the Sudan conflict is in large part a result of the border being new.  [1] Wikipedia, ‘List of conflicts in Africa’, accessed 10 January 2014,


While events cannot be foreseen, fixing fragile states to make conflict less likely is possible. Eradicating poverty is already an international goal and improving governance is a regular concern among donors. The AU recognises that development, democracy and good governance are necessary to ensure stability and peace. [1]  [1] Cilliers, Jakkie, ‘Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa’, ISS Africa, paper 102, April 2005,  , p.2


While we know that so long as there has been recorded history there has been war, we do not know that war is a part of human nature. Indeed there is some evidence that it is not. Research by Abo Academy University has found that primitive societies – tribes that don’t rely on agriculture or domesticated animals – don’t have group conflicts; violence is almost exclusively between individuals. As these societies are a good analogue for society before what we term civilisation arose it is likely that war is a result of civilisation not human nature. [1]  [1] BBC News, ‘Primitive human society ‘not driven by war’’, 18 July 2013,


Africa is the most warlike continent  In 2012 Africa had the most distinct conflicts of any region with 13 ongoing conflicts. [1] While Africa and Asia have throughout most of the last fifty years had roughly similar numbers of conflicts – approximately 10 per year [2] - Africa has had many more non state conflicts and the number has not declined since 2004 when there were 20 non-state conflicts; in 2011 there were 22. [3] All in all there is little hope of managing to end all these conflicts by 2020.  [1] ‘Armed Conflicts 2012’, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2013,   [2] ‘Armed Conflict by Region’, UCDP, 2013,   [3] ‘Non-state Conflicts by Region, 1989-2011’, UCDP, 2012,


No mechanism to prevent crises and war exists  Within countries it is the state that ensures that conflict does not occur: the state has a monopoly on the use of force so ensures law and order. There is no such hierarchy between states. African nations, as with most other states in the world, believe in the sovereign right of states to manage their own affairs. In the same document as there is a pledge to end war “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each of its [AU’s] Member States” is reaffirmed. [1] While states are considered sovereign there is no possible way to create a mechanism to ensure that conflicts do not happen. The AU cannot dictate to its members to ensure they avoid internal conflicts even if the AU knows a conflict is coming as those members are the stakeholders. [2] All that the AU can do is react to ongoing conflicts when it is already spilling out of control and encourage good practice.  [1] African Union, 2013, p.1  [2] Williams, 2011, p.9


Gains may be reversed; events can’t be foreseen  Africa still has many fragile states. The Institute of Strategic Studies Africa identified 26 ‘fragile’ states (meaning they have weak governance, conflict and violence, inequality and poverty) including DR Congo and Ethiopia and forecasts that there will still be 11 fragile states by 2050. [1] This rather implies that war will not be ended by 2050, let alone 2020.  Even in countries that are considered stable events can quickly spiral into conflict. Mali was considered to be democratic and reasonably stable before a coup in 2012: there were multiparty elections in 1992, it held regular elections that passed international inspections, its first president Konaré willingly stood down, there was comparatively good freedom of speech and media. [2] Yet after a coup in 2012 it went downhill to the point of requiring intervention by French troops in early 2013.  [1] Cilliers, Jakkie, and Sick, Timothy D., ‘Prospects for Africa’s 26 fragile countries’, ISS Africa, p.7,   [2] Whitehouse, Bruce, ‘What went wrong in Mali?’, London Review of Books, Vol.34, No.16, 20 August 2012,  , p.17


War is in human nature  War and conflict between groups is in human nature. As Hobbes famously wrote “the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short… Nature should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another”. [1] Although the motives have changed, conflict has been a constant throughout human history. The first militaries were created around 2700 BC but conflict between societies almost certainly occurred before this. [2] Pledging to end all war is high minded, but it is unlikely to actually succeed in overturning human nature.  [1] Hobbes, Thomas, ‘Chapter XIII of the Natural Condition of Mankind as concerning their felicity and misery’, Leviathan,   [2] Gabriel, Richard A., and Metz, Karen S., A Short History of War, 1992,


While the AU cannot completely prevent conflicts from breaking out it is establishing a Continental Early Warning System. This will use publically available information and involve organisations at all levels from international to local to enable the AU, and any threatened states, to take preventive action in the common good. This is linked to regional organisations such as ECOWAS which has its own conflict prevention mechanisms and has the authority to react with peacekeeping, mediation of disputes or other peace building mechanisms. [1]  The AU can also ensure any conflicts that do break out are ended quickly. The creation of the African Standby Force should give the AU the strength to react to crises and prevent conflicts escalating.  [1] Cilliers, 2005, pp.1, 10


Africa is not the most warlike continent in terms of the frequency or duration of conflicts. Asia had 1.88 wars per country from 1960 to 2008 compared to 1.65 per country in Africa. [1] Moreover many more of these armed conflicts are internal and are smaller.  [1] Straus, 2012, p.186


imate international global house believes outcome paris climate conference

While there are sure to be some countries that won’t live up to their pledges this is also the case with binding agreements even if they have built in penalties. This has been shown by the European Union where Germany and France both flouted budget rules that allowed a maximum deficit of 3% at the start of the millennium despite the threat of fines. [1]  [1] Osborn, Andrew, ‘France and Germany to flout budget rules until 2006’, The Guardian, 30 October 2003,


Only an international treaty can create penalties for non-compliance  A non-binding agreement will not have any penalties for any countries that do not comply with it, this sets the agreement up for failure. Without a binding agreement a government will find it difficult to bind its successors who may back track in the decades that follow. Some states are backtracking even before the agreement is finalised; the UK has been abandoning its green policies – cutting subsidies for renewables, cancelling carbon capture and storage, reducing funding for domestic energy efficiency, and selling the green investment bank. [1] If governments will take such measures before the agreement is even finished then what hope does it have in the future if there is nothing to persuade sovereign governments to comply with their pledges?  [1] Monbiot, George, ‘On climate change this government is indifferent to life, in love with death’, The Guardian, 2 December 2015,


Voluntary measures have got much further than previous attempts to get a binding agreement – at least there is going to be a good working agreement to build on in future this time. The changes that could mean countries ultimately targeting 2C or even 1.5C are technological; if solar becomes the cheapest form of electricity generation, if electric cars become competitive with petrol, and biofuels taken up for aviation fuel. [1]  [1] Mathiesen, Karl, ‘Should we be aiming to keep global warming to 1.5C, not 2C?’, The Guardian,. 2 December 2015,


The hard part is the cutting of emissions  The problem with a non-binding agreement, even one where the targets have been submitted by the governments themselves is exactly that it is non-binding. If governments are not bound to cut emissions then there is a good chance that many of them wont. [1] The British government, which has binding targets, has been on course to miss its 2025 targets with reductions of only 23% against targets of 31% due to a decision to reduce subsidies for housing insulation. [2] If countries which have set targets for themselves in the past are missing them what hope do we have for these voluntary targets?  [1] Taylor, Lenore, ‘Paris climate talks: the real test is whether countries will keep their word’, The Guardian, 30 November 2015,   [2] Harvey, Fiona, ‘UK on track to miss carbon targets, climate change advisers warn’, The Guardian, 15 July 2014,


Each government has put in targets that they believe are realistic and that they are willing to try to reach. The countries involved are therefore much more likely to want to meet the target than if they had been imposed on them by a binding international treaty. Europe has found that binding refugee quotas are almost impossible to agree and equally difficult to implement. [1] Instead it has generally been accepted that only voluntary systems will work when it comes to taking in the majority of refugees with Hungary willing to take legal action to prevent mandatory quotas. [2] The same is the case on greenhouse gas emissions.  [1] Euractive, ‘Commission ready to drop mandatory quotas for refugees’, 17 September 2015,   [2] BBC News, ‘Migrant crisis: Hungary challenges EU quota plan in court’, 3 December 2015,


It is too late for half measures  Two degrees Celsius has generally been regarded as that safe level which agreements should be aiming for. This agreement does not go so far with it expected to keep the temperature increase to around 2.7 degrees if everyone sticks to their commitments and makes deeper ones after 2030. [1] Unfortunately however the world will still most likely be heading towards a 3.5 degrees rise if no further cuts are made later. [2] Now is the time to be much more ambitious and part of that means binding cuts to prevent backsliding or those agreeing carrying on as usual.  [1] Nuttall, Nick, ‘Global Response to Climate Change Keeps Door Open to 2 Degree C Temperature Limit’, UNFCCC Press Office, 30 October 2015,   [2] Romm, Joe, ‘Misleading U.N. Report Confuses Media on Paris Climate Talks’, thinkprogress.org, 3 November 2015,


The United States Senate would be a potential sticking point for any treaty however it would be unlikely that the United States would hold out against the rest of the world. At the worst case it would simply sign next time the democrats gain a majority.


Sovereignty is often taken to mean that states can do what they like without interference. This is not the kind of mentality that will help solve climate change or ensure that this deal sticks. Unfortunately climate change is a global issue where what happens in one country affects everyone else just as much as the miscreant. The atmosphere is a global commons, currently free for everyone to use, and more often abuse. As such the principles of sovereignty and non-interference can have no place.


Only a non-binding agreement would get the targets necessary  Fully binding treaties with mechanisms for compliance are the gold standard for agreements between nations. But because they are onerous they are the most difficult kind of treaties to get agreed to start with. If the aim were such an agreement it would unfortunately never happen. This has been demonstrated by the years of successive failures in crafting climate agreements. COP 15 is the most notable; expectations were immensely high for a binding international treaty but there was a failure to deliver, largely because governments did not want a binding international solution which is what was being negotiated at Copenhagen. [1]  [1] BBC News, ‘Why did Copenhagen fail to deliver a climate deal?’, 22 December 2009,


A more informal agreement avoids the US congress  The United States Congress is a potential hurdle for any climate agreement. While President Barack Obama is keen to make tackling climate change a legacy of his Presidency the Republican dominated Congress is both likely to try to block the President for that very reason and is sceptical of climate change. It is therefore a major benefit to have an agreement that will not need to be submitted to Congress for approval as any treaty needs to be confirmed by the Senate.  The Secretary of State Kerry argues that it is “definitely not going to be a treaty,” and “not going to be legally binding reduction targets like Kyoto”. It won’t need to be passed to the Senate because the President already has the power to implement the agreement through existing law. [1]  [1] Mufson, Steven, and Demirjian, Karoun, ‘Trick or treaty? The legal question hanging over the Paris climate change conference’, Washington Post, 30 November 2015,


Sovereign states should be allowed to set their own targets and be trusted to meet them  States are sovereign entities meaning that only they have power within their borders and climate change should not be a cause for groups of countries meddling in the business of others. Each state making its own commitment and then doing its own monitoring and enforcement is the right way to go about preventing climate change. By doing it this way no countries will feel unduly burdened or persecuted.


There is little reason why countries can’t voluntarily come up with their quotas and then be bound to them by treaty. Being willing to be bound by a treaty would show that the targets submitted are really the targets that countries are setting for themselves rather than a public relations exercise.


bate living difference international middle east house believes news

This is really not an issue about the reporting of gay marriage or the opportunities to host a pride march. In many of these countries gay men and women face repression, imprisonment and violence. Regardless of the victims of such actions, it says something fundamental about the perpetrators of those actions – governments, security services or religious groups – that they perform the actions at all. Privacy is an argument to be used to prevent discrimination, not cover-ups of discrimination and abuse; those who are offended by such reporting can invoke their privacy simply by tuning out.  Equally it is questionable that proposition would make such an argument based on the view that certain racial, ethnic or religious groups were less than human and it might trouble bigots of another stripe to see their interests of those communities mentioned in the media. It is difficult to find a definition of Human Rights that would not condemn the suppression of individuals on the basis of sexuality that does not also have to argue that gay men and women are less than human. Such an argument is as offensive as it is palpably untrue.


On issues such as gay marriage, human rights activists have taken the line that the right to marry is nobody else’s business. That principle of privacy should work both ways.  Many have argued that issues relating to homosexual relations are, fundamentally, a matter of privacy. That we should respect the rights of individuals to live their lives as they see fit without having the views, actions and opinions imposed upon them. [1] It’s a reasonable position but must surely relate to viewers and readers as much as it does to the subjects of news stories.  If gay men and women have the right to live their lives free from the intervention of other traditions and beliefs then so do those communities – religious and otherwise – that find some of their demands offensive or objectionable.  If the rights to privacy and self-determination are supported by those who support gay rights, then it would be inconsistent to suggest that this does not generate a right to avoid offence on behalf of those receiving news.  [1] Human rights campaign, ‘Should gay marriage be legal?’, procon.org, updated 10th August 2012,


It seems perverse to suggest that consumers of news would be likely to abandon a channel on the basis of one story – or even several. Decisions by consumers of news are determined far more by the general outlook of a channel than by particular stories – it is rare to find individuals who are interested in the entire output of a news organisation.  In addition, new organisations clearly have an interest in covering areas that are ignored by their competitors because it gives them a commercial advantage both through appealing to new groups but also through enhancing their reputation for impartial reporting. There is clearly a gap in the market to provide reporting of gay issues and it therefore should be in news organisations interests to fill that gap. This is exactly what al Jazeera did when it was set up; it filled a gap left by the closure of BBC Arabic for a broadcaster that is willing to "report the news as they see it." [1]  [1] ‘History of Al Jazeera Television’, Allied Media Corp,  accessed 14 August 2012


Broadcasters almost never show scenes of torture or torment because they know this will cause offence, the same principle should apply here.  Journalists and editors use their judgement all the time on what is acceptable to print or broadcast. Expletives [1] or graphic images of violence or sex are routinely prevented because they would cause offence, giving personal details might cause distress and are omitted as a courtesy, and the identities of minors are protected as a point of law in most jurisdictions. It is simply untrue to suggest that journalists report the ‘unvarnished truth’ with no regard to its ramifications. Where a particular fact or image is likely to cause offence or distress, it is routine to exercise self-censorship – it’s called discretion and professional judgement [2] . Indeed, the news outlets that fail to do so are the ones most frequently and vociferously denounced by the high-minded intelligentsia who so frequently argue that broadcasting issues such as this constitutes free speech.  It is palpably and demonstrably true that news outlets seek to avoid offending their market; so liberal newspapers avoid exposés of bad behaviour by blacks or homosexuals otherwise they wouldn’t have a readership. [3] Most journalists try to minimise the harm caused by their reporting as shown by a study interviewing journalists on their ethics but how they define this harm and what they think will cause offence differs. [4] Western journalists may find it awkward that many in the Arab world find the issue of homosexuality unpleasant or offensive but many of the same journalists would be aghast if they were asked to report activities that ran counter to their cultural sensibilities simply as fact.  [1] Trask, Larry, ‘The Other Marks on Your Keyboard’, University of Sussex, 1997,   [2] For example see the BBC guide to editorial policy.  [3] Posner, Richard, A., ‘Bad News’, The New York Times, 31 July 2005,   [4] Deppa, Joan A, & Plaisance, Patrick Lee, 2009 ‘Perceptions and Manifestations of Autonomy, Transparency and Harm Among U.S. Newspaper Journalists’, Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, pp.328-386, p.358,


All of the issues that Prop raises are matters of choice - the use of expletives or the visual portrayal of a brutal act are the representations of an active choice, either by the subject of the story or the reporter. The endemic homophobia in the Arab world attacks people on the basis of their humanity, if people were being imprisoned for having green eyes or red hair or black skin or breasts or an attraction to the opposite sex, nobody would suggest that there were cultural sensitivities involved. Journalists would report it as a crime of apartheid.  Free speech is grounded in giving voice to the voiceless, not only regardless of the fact that some may find that inconvenient but in active defiance of it. Journalism at its best recognises that fact. For example the ethics guide of the American Society of Professional Journalists states that journalists should, “Tell the story of the diversity and magnitude of the human experience even when it is unpopular to do so.” [1] At its worst it’s merely a handy way of filling space between adverts for washing powder; the best of journalism happens when it challenges, takes risks and, frequently, offends. In demonstrating that an American President was, in fact, a crook, [2] or reminding Western viewers that there was a famine happening in much of Africa, the journalists concerned made their readers and viewers uncomfortable because they reminded them that they were complicit.  [1] Quoted in Handbook for Journalists. Publ. Reporters Without Borders. P 91.  [2] ‘Watergate at 40’, Washington Post, June 2012,


Where there is a clear objection to discussing a certain subject, insisting on doing so is not news, it’s propaganda.  Ultimately all news outlets report that which is of interest to their viewers. Where there is no interest or, more frequently, an active lack of interest, news outlet do not - and should not – impose a particular set of judgements or interests on their customers. Doing so would arguably be patronizing and certainly be financial suicide [1] .  As a result they report what is both interesting and acceptable to those who consume the news and, for the vast majority of news outlets, the companies that advertise on the station, website or in the paper. Expecting news outlets to ignore those simple realities is asking them to self-destruct by ignoring their market. It is a clear example of sacrificing the good in the name of the best – in the example given, the writer mentions that Al Jazeera covers stories relating to gay rights but does so on its English language channels. [2] This exactly shows the market in action; Al Jazeera English broadcasts mostly to a European audience who are not offended by reports on gay rights whereas “Al Jazeera Arabic is geared towards a Middle Eastern audience and does not challenge cultural values or orthodox religion”. [3]  [1] For example the actions of advertisers and readers killed the News of the World.  [2] Pellot, Brian, 2012, ‘(Not) reporting homosexuality in the Middle East’, Free Speech Debate,   [3] Krajnc, Anita, ‘Al Jazeera Arabic ignores gay news’, Toronto Media Co-op, 2 August 2010,


A liberal bias among the journalistic elite in the West is hardly reason for changing the editorial policies of news outlets in nations that do not share those values. The first duty of the journalist must be their role as the eyes and ears of those for whom they do their reporting – the readers and viewers who both directly and indirectly pay their salaries. As a result, there is a duty on journalists not only to report those issues of interest to that group but to avoid those issues which their customers consider either irrelevant or distasteful.


It is routine to make determinations on the basis of the race or religion of those affected in a story as to whether it is newsworthy or not. Sixty people of another nationality die in an accident, it may be barely reported, if two people of the news outlet’s home nationality dies in such a tragedy then it is a major story. The interests and prejudices of the consumers of news are reflected all the time in what editors consider to be important.


Citizens deserve the right to know what is happening in their name.  It is up to the public to decide whether those actions that are reported are right or wrong, journalists and broadcasters should not act as a filter in that process. Many of these actions – imprisonments, internments, brutality and others – are conducted by governments in the name of the people. Sometimes this is done under euphemisms such as ‘protecting public morality’ or in the name of a majority religion. This is used as a catch all as shown by the case of journalist Sofiene Chourabi who was arrested for ‘harming public morals’ in response to calling for a protest against the governing party in Tunisia. [1] It seems only reasonable that people have the right to know what is being done in their name, how their morality is being ‘protected’ or what their faith is being used to justify.  The failure to do so assumes that the public – individually and collectively – are either to foolish to understand or too callous to care. Either or both of those things may be true, although it seems unlikely, but it is certainly not the role of the individual journalist or editor to make such an assumption. Even was that assumption true, it still does not change the facts. In the words of C.P. Snow, “Comment is free but facts are sacred”. [2] These events happened, they happened to citizens of that country, they affect how the rest of the world views that country and how the government views and treats its citizens. On every count, that is news.  [1] ‘Tunisian journalist faces ‘public morals’ charge after criticizing government’, Amnesty International, 8 August 2012,   [2] ‘Comment is free’, guardian.co.uk,