Poverty creates a vicious circle  Unfortunately, there is a vicious circle, caused by poverty that many poor countries find themselves in. A poor country also means a poor, ill-funded government. Such an institution is either unhelpful in preventing poverty or a road block to poverty alleviation. A poor population is also unfortunately more likely to lead to an autocratic government. This phenomenon can be shown by looking at decolonisation. Poor countries when decolonised, even if they initially had democratic aspirations quickly fell to dictatorship. There are very few exceptions such as India that have managed to continually maintain a democratic government while poor. Wealthy countries when decolonised are much more likely to become democracies and once poor autocracies become rich the pressure for democratisation usually becomes unstoppable so countries like South Korea democratised as they became wealthy. There might be considered to be a wealth threshold about which states will become democracies.(1)  The reason why poverty is likely to lead to dictatorship is simple; a lack of an educated, effective civil service. When the government is very small it can’t effectively control the whole country or ensure accountability. The result, especially when civil servants are poorly paid is corruption and an opening for the army, or any populist who appears to offer a solution to take power. Once dictatorship occurs it can usually be maintained by force until the population is educated and connected enough to engage in a democratic revolution.  There is then a free pass for those in power to exploit their position through corruption. Many dictators, including in Africa have become very rich indeed. Mohammed Suharto, Ferdinand Marcos and Mobutu Sese Seko( the former dictators of Indonesia, the Philippines, and DR Congo) extorted up to $50bn (£28bn) from their impoverished people (2).  A vicious cycle is created whereby the government needs money, so corruption and extortion are rampant. Those in power are more concerned with their own wealth than the people which makes the government poorer and less efficient so providing more incentive to resort to illicit means of funding.  (1) Cois, Carles; and Stokes, Susan C., ‘Endogenous Democratization’, The University of Chicago, 3 June 2003,   (2) Denny, Charlotte, ‘Suharto, Marcos and Mobutu head corruption table with $50bn scams’, The Guardian, 26 March 2004


Armed forces do not require large amounts of funding to be well disciplined forces that are subordinate to civilian governance. This was shown by many communist nations; Vietnam’s army was immense, beat both the French and Americans and was firmly under party control. The importance of armed forces for security is universally recognised so foreign powers will help train armed forces to ensure these qualities. Thus for example as part of efforts to bring peace to Sierra Leone Britain provided training for the Sierra Leone Armed Forces helping bring stability to the country and allowing the Sierra Leonean army to engage in peace keeping missions elsewhere in Africa.(1)  (1) Clapson, Joe, ‘Sierra Leonean army comes of age under British direction’, Ministry of Defence, 6 April 2011,


Poverty means more crime  Despite many problems that Africa has to face, one of the biggest is its extreme poverty. Currently more than 48.5% of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa lives on less than 1.25 dollars a day (1). As a result of this poverty people’s security is being threatened on two main levels.  On the first level of analysis, poverty can lead to crime. Poverty can create desperation to provide for family or yourself. As poverty is widespread in Africa, there are many people who are willing to steal, threaten, abduct or kill someone, in order to have something to eat. At 17.4 per 100,000 citizens, more than double the world average, Africa has the highest homicide rate among all regions of the world.(2) The other side of this is that a poor state can’t provide the level of policing that richer states can, a people in poverty usually results in a poor government. This in turn means that the police force is small, badly trained and underfunded so not fit for preventing crime.  On the second level of analysis, desperate people are much easier to manipulate. This makes them easy targets for military groups in Africa who are searching for members to fight for their causes. It is not coincidental that we have so many militias and juntas in Africa, such as Somali Pirates, AQAP, AQIM, Al-Shabab, Touareg( Mali), Boko Haram(Nigeria), M23 and dozens of others. The militias offer those in poverty what they need most, food, shelter, and protection in return for their “services”. Poverty provides an additional benefit for these groups due to the stark difference between potential reward, such as from piracy or winning control of mines, and a normal income. As with the drugs trade the lure of the fast buck can be used to encourage risk-taking.  In conclusion, poverty both enables crime and encourages militia groups.  (1) The World Bank, ‘Poverty’, data.worldbank.org, 2013,   (2) Me, Angela, et al., ‘2011 Global Study on Homicide trends, contexts, data’, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes, 2011,


Does poverty cause crime, or does crime cause poverty? Poverty does not in all cases create crime. Bhutan is a poor country but the state department reports “There is relatively little crime” (1). When there is crime skilled people are more likely to emigrate and trust relationships are destroyed making businesses risk averse. At the same time outside businesses won’t invest in the country and neither will individuals because they fear they won’t get their money back. Finally crime almost invariably means corruption which undermines state institutions, trust in the state and ultimately democracy (2). Crime therefore leads to poverty more than the other way around.  Neither does poverty have much to do with armed anti-government movements, terrorists or militia. Terrorism is an inherently a political struggle. Almost every major terrorist organization that exists has emerged from a conflict revolving around the subject of sovereignty and defending of their culture. Al Qaeda was created after the soviet invasion of Afghanistan and ETA fights for the independence of the Basque county so groups in Africa are ethically or religiously based. The needs and desires of the poorest are much more short-sighted, such as having enough to eat and somewhere to sleep. They would much rather stability. A 2007 study by economist Alan B. Krueger found that terrorists were less likely to come from an impoverished background (28% vs. 33%) and more likely to have at least a high-school education (47% vs. 38%). Another analysis found only 16% of Palestinian terrorists came from impoverished families, vs. 30% of male Palestinians, and over 60% had gone beyond high school, vs. 15% of the populace.(3)  Moreover a rebellion, even if it involves potential financial gain, is not a good long term prospect. In the long term the government tends to win. For example with FARC in Columbia a security build-up over the past decade has reduced the rebels from 18,000 fighters at their peak to about 10,000 today (4) The idea of fighting a war against an army which is bigger, better funded and better equipped isn’t exactly thrilling.  (1) U.S. Department of State, ‘Bhutan’, travel.state.gov, 2013,   (2) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Crime and Development in Africa’, gsdrc, 2005,   (3) Levitt, Steven D.; Dubner, Stephen J. , Superfreakonomics: global cooling, patriotic prostitutes, and why suicide bombers should buy life insurance, (William Morrow 2009)  (4) “To the edge and back”, The Economist, 31 August 2013,


Poor states have trouble providing security  Poor nations find it difficult to sustain efficient and well-disciplined armies. Good training and regular pay is vital for this, something that is unlikely to be forthcoming with a cash strapped government. Yet such a disciplined army is one of the vital prerequisites for security and a stable country.  Discipline is needed to prevent the army turning on those it is supposed to protect, and it is need to secure the country from other groups both internal and external. Poverty therefore enables rebellions, civil wars, and local warlords by helping ensure that the poor states involved don’t have the resources to control their territories. It should come as no surprise that of 12 major ongoing conflicts five are on the African Continent (and another one if the conflict in DR Congo were to be included despite it potentially being at an end).(1)  In addition to this, a poorly funded army is a threat in itself, as the lack of training of the soldiers may translate into unprofessional behaviour, such as engaging in crimes and rapes, or even worse launching a full scale coup in the hope that they will grip the power.  (1) list of ongoing armed conflicts’, Wikipedia, accessed 21 November 2011,


Ethnicity does not always cause tension, and it is not always difficult to solve. If Africa has thousands of ethnic groups and multiple religions the most noticeable thing has to be that the vast majority of these groups do coexist peacefully. There are at most a couple of dozen different conflicts in Africa compared to these thousands of divisions. Identity might therefore be considered to be an overblown cause of conflict here.  Moreover is an ethnic divide always difficult to solve? No. If it is not a particularly deep divide then it can be sorted out through education and creating a sense of community. There also needs to be a look at the underlying problems; in most cases ethnic conflicts are not simply about attacking the other group because they are the ‘other’ instead there is something that group wants. At base then the conflict is likely to be over land, economic resources, discrimination etc. not the simple fact that they have a neighbour that is not exactly the same as them. The solution then is the same as with poverty; encouraging economic growth and ensuring good redistribution.  Finally if there is no other choice and two groups within a state are irreconcilable then there is a relatively quick, if not particularly easy, solution; partition. Simply create separate homelands for both ethnic groups.(1)  (1) Zachary, G. Pascal, ‘Africa Needs a New Map’, Foreign Policy, 28 April 2010,


At first glance western countries might seem to be the opposite of Africa with regards to ethnicity. Countries like France are ideal type nation states with ‘national’ borders based upon ethnicity. However in practice western states have large numbers of minorities whether this is through regions with local identities such as the Welsh or immigration. However despite such intermixing there is not the security threat as in Africa.  The most obvious reasons here is wealth. It is the state of the economy that is the main root of violence in Africa and that is the preserver of peace in Western liberal democracies. Rich countries can afford to use their wealth to paper over any cracks created by different identities. They can afford impartial civil services which have little incentive to favour one group over another. And when it come to religion there is a link between education and how religious someone is; one study has estimated an extra year of schooling leads to a 4 percentage-point increase in the likelihood that an individual reports having no religious affiliation at all.(1)  (1) Dubner, Stephen J., ‘Does More Education Lead to Less Religion?’, Freakonomics, 25 April 2011,


Society cant function when the population is divided  Successful nations are those with a strong unified sense of purpose. They are states where it is allegiance to the state which is put first. Having different identities which are put first undermines the state. This is exactly what strong religious and ethnic identities do. If these sub state identities are put before the national identity then ethnic groups are likely to “other” anyone who is not a part of their group. If they do not consider themselves as being a part of the same polity there is little reason to cooperate, to pay taxes,  It is the failure to build a unifying framework and these conflicts of identity that split nations apart not poverty. The Rwandan genocide did not happen because Rwanda is poor but because it is split between two groups who, at least for that horrific period, looked at themselves as Hutus or Tutsi’s first and Rwandans second. The rebels in Syria show how strong such divisions can be as rebels fight each other as well as Assad’s regime.(1) In Ivory Coast a country that had previously been considered stable burst into civil war in 2011 after elections that went along ethnic lines.(2)  (1) Dettmer, Jamie, “Syrian Rebel Groups Fight Among Themselves”, Voice of America, 19 September 2013   (2) “African viewpoint: Blood and borders” BBC News, 1 February 2011,


Identity issues are very difficult to solve  Issues of identity are much more difficult to solve than issues of poverty. Poverty is primarily an issue of economics and can be solved in numerous ways; through aid, development projects, greater exploitation of natural resources, and through policies to encourage economic development. However none of this is likely to happen if there is ethnic conflict.  Where the problem is one of identity there is no fast solution. Ethnicity remains the same throughout someone’s life. Religion is only rarely changed. Customs and traditions only slowly evolve. No matter how hard government tries, these artificial barriers cannot be changed or erased easily. The only solution then is to attempt to work around the problem by not eliminating identities but showing commonalities, itself a slow process.  Spain is an example of how a country can escape poverty but not identity. From the 1980’s Spain enjoyed an economic miracle pulling the country up to being a developed nation. And again after the economic crash changes in policies have managed to halt decline and even move Spain towards recovery.(1) Yet despite a state that has constantly encouraged integration the regions of Spain are more determined than ever to get a chance to decide their own future. Cataluña and the Basque Country in particular want independence.(2)  (1) Benoit, Angeline, “Spain Exits Two-Year Recession as Rajoy Seeks Recovery”, Bloomberg, 30 October 2013,   (2) “Nothing to lose but their chains”, The Economist, 14 September 2013,


Ethno-religious divides are a bigger security threat  Poverty is clearly an immense problem for Africa but it is not primarily a security problem. There are parts of the globe such as South Asia and parts of South East Asia that have comparable poverty but little conflict and violence. Moreover not every African country is plagued with conflict. We therefore must look elsewhere for why Africa has high levels of conflict. Religious and Ethnic divisions are a much more direct security threat and cause for conflicts.  To start with, it is extremely easy to blame people of other ethnicity or religion of your own problems. This occurs throughout the world, no matter if we are talking about immigrants coming into the EU and US, about the Kurdish population in Turkey or about Israel and Palestine. Africa has 3315 ethnic groups, a huge number (1). Unlike Europe these have not been formed into cohesive nations with colonial borders often arbitrarily cutting through ethnic groups. A conflict is 25 percent longer and has a has a higher casualty rate when an ethnicity is divided by a national border. Examples of divided (and conflicted) groups are the Maasai of Kenya and Tanzania, and the Anyi of Ghana and the Ivory Coast. (2)  Division also occurs between religions. Samuel P Huntington wrote a famous book ‘The Clash of Civilisations’ that highlights that conflict is often created between religions. In Africa this means conflict in a swathe of northern Africa where Islam and Christianity meet. For example, the Muslim terrorist organization called Boko Haram, which has a lot of support in Nigeria, is engaged in a massive against Christians which has been responsible for the deaths of hundreds of non-Muslims.(2)  (1) Wentzel, Dr. John, ‘Who are the developing world’, johnwentzel.com, 28 February 2013,   (2) Gilman, Azure, ‘The Violent Legacy of Africa’s Arbitrary Borders’, Freakonomics, 12 January 2011,   (3) Stark, William, “Boko Haram's Anti-Christian Violence Continues in Northern Nigeria”, Religion Today, 13 September 2013,


Fortunately the solution to this particular problem is exactly the same as the solution to poverty; fixing the dysfunctional state. There have been many multi-ethnic countries that have successfully created a sense of ‘nationhood’ and shared identity among people of different ethnicities and faiths. India, Indonesia, Brazil and the United States are all good examples. This needs to be done through education, government having an impartial presence in the population’s lives, infrastructure, and through ensuring that different ethnicities see that working together provides benefits for all.  State building is necessary to prevent this internal ethnic conflict but having a strong state is also a foundation for creating a dynamic economy that reduces, and eventually eliminates poverty. Brazil is both a good example of integration of large numbers of ethnicities; the ‘rainbow nation’ and an example of state intervention reducing poverty through the bolsa familia, payments for sending children to school which coincidently helps educating so encouraging a sense of nation.(1)  (1) Nobrega, Camila, ‘Bolsa-Família: template for poverty reduction or recipe for dependency?’ Guardian Professional, 5 November 2013,


The EAC is not yet ready to fully support its missions. The East African Community military command have not helped in prevention of terrorist attacks in Kenya nor has it been able to stop the prolonged insecurities and conflicts in Burundi, besides it still needs improvement. The unity between Kenya and Uganda did not stop conflicts arising over ownership of Migingo islands on lake Victoria; membership would not mean that South Sudan and Sudan suddenly have similar interests or ameliorate their conflict.  Rwanda and Uganda have been recently accused of supporting insecurity in Eastern Congo (1), and the peace keeping missions in Somalia and Darfur are both AU and UN initiatives not the EAC. In practice the bloc is not yet ready to embark on such wider missions.  (1) Louis, Charbonneau, and Michelle, Nicholls ‘Rwanda, Uganda arming Congo rebels- UN panel’, reuters.com, 17/10/2012


Conflicts and insecurity in the region will be resolved.  Widening the East African Community will help provide a strong force and voice against insecurities, conflicts and insurgencies that have torn apart much of the region.  The current EAC member states have been at the fore front of maintaining peace and security in the region, with Burundi, Kenya and Uganda sending troops to Somalia and Rwanda sending troops to Darfur and CAR.  In March 2012, the USAID assessment on East Africa regional conflict and instability highlighted that the revival and expansion of the EAC would favour a vision of promoting peace in the region (1) pointing out the Lamu project aimed at creating a transport corridor linking South Sudan to northern Kenya and the coast. Widening the bloc will make it easy for member states to support their peacekeeping missions through the East Africa community military command and also help reduce interstate invasions like Sudan and South Sudan or Rwanda and DRC as they will now be united with more closely aligned interests.  (1) USAID, ‘East Africa Regional conflict and instability Assessment, usaid.gov, March 2012,


Widening the EAC will affect the emerging education systems. Most of the countries with interest to join the EAC are characterised by poor education systems. Bringing Somalia, South Sudan and DRC, into the community would bring a huge challenge to the existing systems. The inter university council of education is a new established body, policies like harmonising the education curricula are still in process of implementation and this cannot be rated a success at the moment let alone be expanded to millions more children and youths. Additionally, there are still current member states like Burundi with crippled education systems (1), why not first focus internally and deepen these institutions before expanding?  (1) Concern worldwide, Burundi, ‘education’, concernusa.org


Economic Development will be boosted in the entire region.  Widening the East African Community, will help enlarge the common market, increase production and improve regional trade as people will be able to freely do business across more than five countries.  Prior to Rwanda and Burundi’s membership to the bloc in 2004, Kenya’s exports and imports to the EAC were Kshs 64 billion and Kshs 3 billion respectively this however increased after the two countries joined creating a single market of 133.5 million people. In 2009 Kenya’s exports had risen to Kshs 90.5 billion and imports to Kshs 12.5 billion [1].  Ethiopia, DRC and South Sudan are all mineral rich countries and are big potential markets for East Africa. Welcoming them to the community is predicted to double the production, imports and exports among member states [2] due to policies policies like the EAC trade facilitation, customs union and competition policy and law [2].  [1] Mary, Odongo,’Institute of Economic Affairs; Towards an East African Community common market’, ieakenya.or.ke, 30 Jan 2011,   [2] Ernest & Young, ‘The East Africa boom’, ey.com,   [3] East African Community Customs, ‘market size, access and trade policy’, eu.int,


Widening the bloc will also widen the burden of satisfying all member states which will affect economic development. The discovery of oil in Uganda has prompted concerns about how it will be extracted as a result of a green light to foreign companies to do the job [1], and Rwanda’s natural gas remain untouched due to a lack of skilled labour despite the EAC freedom of movement policies. Why then bring a bigger burden of un-extracted mineral resources that cannot be handled by EAC? And the fact that Kenya has been able to profit from such integration has not done much to lift Burundi from extreme poverty Or prevent Tanzania’s slow growth [2]. When all members are looking to export natural resources there are few benefits to the bloc, the members find themselves competing in export markets.  [1] Oil review, ‘Uganda to sign oil drilling agreement with international oil firms’, oilreviewafrica.com, 15 April 2013,   [2] IMF, ‘Truly integrated market would bring benefits to East Africa’, imf.org, 15 March 2012,


Pan-Africanism is more a dream than a reality. Widening the East African Community would actually alter and destroy the meaning of Pan-Africanism because of the many challenges that come with such integration (1). Currently there are disputes within the EAC itself with Tanzania and Burundi claiming to be sidelined from the other three states. People will never at any moment feel more East Africans than citizens of a particular country; recently Rwandans who had lived in Tanzania for years were forcibly deported by the government (2) despite the fact that both countries are member states of the EAC and signed free movement into law. This is enough to explain how things would be a mess if rival countries like DRC, Sudan and Somalia were to join the bloc.  (1) United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, ‘Assessing regional integration in Africa’, uneca.org, Vol.V,   (2) Catherine, Byaruhanga, ‘Thousands deported from Tanzania to Rwanda’, bbc.co.uk, 2 Sept 2013


Education standards will be improved across the region  improvement of education among member states. It has policies such as the introduction of the inter University council of education to ensure the quality of University education, and an ongoing process of harmonising education curricula in all member countries (1). However, Africa still remains the continent with poorest quality of education and has the lowest skilled/educated labour. A large number of children fail to access basic education (2). Enlarging and deepening the EAC will therefore enhance education standards on a large part of the African continent; such policies will lift weak academic institutions in DRC, South Sudan and Somalia which are typical of their poor education systems.  (1) East African Community Education, ‘Harmonisation of education and training curricula in East Africa’ eac.int,   (2) Kevin Watkins, ‘Narrowing Africa’s Education deficit’, brookings.com, January 2013,


It will serve an example of Pan-Africanism and encourage many to join the movement.  Nkwame Nkurumah, one of the famous African heroes said “Africa must unite or perish”. This has been taken up by the African Union which is calling for integration across the continent (1). Widening and deepening the EAC will therefore shine a light to the ideology of Pan Africanism. Bringing more African states together under one bloc with the same vision and institutions will help people to work together regardless of ethnic or cultural differences. Citizens will feel more East Africans rather than citizens of a particular country as every citizen of the EAC member state is allowed to freely travel in the region with no difficulties or discrimination as a result of the East African Community’s freedom of movement(2). This will therefore encourage other blocs like the ECOWAS and SADC to actively perform and widen hence creating a more united Africa.  (1) African Union, ‘Celebrating Pan –Africanism and African renaissance’, au.int, 10 May 2013,   (2) East African Community, Towards a common market, ‘Annex on the free movement of persons’, eac.int,


The EAC does not have a general rule that membership is only reserved for countries in the Eastern region of Africa, and the presence of the African Union does not deem other regional blocs useless. To achieve growth and integration on the continent, there is great need to unite regionally[1]. Having members that are also members of other regional organisations simply helps bring those organisations together to the benefit of all.  [1] Michael, Rettig, Anne W. Kamau and Augustus, Sammy, Muluv,’ The African Union can do more to support regional integration’, brookings.edu, 17 May 2013,


Initially the EAC comprised of only three countries but after only 7 years, Rwanda and Burundi joined the bloc [1]. The new members however did not hamper the progress of the EAC but instead increased the rate of performance and improvement. If anything the two new countries added momentum in the operations of the bloc despite the fact that they were both economically weak. It is therefore not valid to assume that enlargement would hinder progress.  [1] East African Community, ‘About EAC’, eac.int,


The potential entrants are still weak and pose a threat to the growing EAC  Most of the countries showing interest in joining the EAC are still economically weak, politically unstable, and socially divided. Somalia is the poorest state in the world; it is unstable with a high rate of terrorism [1]. DRC has yet to fully end its civil war, and has large social divides [2]. And South Sudan is a newly independent country that has not yet finished forming its governing institutions but already faces conflicts both internal and external. Accepting all these countries to the East African community now would create instability; it would clear the way for more Al shabab attacks in both Kenya and Uganda due as the borders would be open, it would clear a path for the FDLR (a rebel group that includes some of those responsible for Rwanda’s genocide) from Congo to Rwanda, a threat that the EAC is not ready to manage.  [1] Ludger, Schadomsky, ‘No stability in sight for Somalia’, dw.de, 20 June 2013   [2] Jason, Stearns, ‘The Congo; a revolution deferred’, sscr.org, 8 March 2012,


The EAC is not different from the AU which aims at integrating all African states.  All countries that have shown interest in joining the EAC are member states of the AU which oversees integration in African countries; there is no reason then for them to join another bloc that has the same aim as the African Union unless it is no longer functioning.  Countries like DRC and Sudan are geographically located in different regions than East Africa and this would breach the meaning of the bloc. Additionally, these individual countries are members of other regional organisations like COMESA and SADC which puts a challenge of flexibility in adopting different policies from separate blocs. [1] For example how could a customs union operate if DRC were to be a member of two separate customs unions? any external barriers between the two could be bypassed by going through the DRC.  [1] Dinka,T,Kennes,W, ‘Africa’s regional integration arrangements; history and challenges’, ecdpm.org, 2007,


The EAC is not yet a strong bloc to be widened  The EAC, though a progressing bloc, is premature for widening. 48% of its budget is derived from the EU and 22% from other donor agencies and governments. Membership subscriptions barely suffice to cover staff remuneration and other administrative costs leaving no funds to support development oriented programmes [1]. 71.3% of Congolese [2] and 50.6% of South Sudanese [3] live below the poverty line; how would the EAC support such regions with a crippled budget? Creating a common market would mean bringing together poor countries that have nothing to offer or learn from each other unlike the EU which has strong economies to support weaker ones and provide role models and expertise for development.  There is a greater need to deepen the bloc by ensuring that member states are able to meet the pledged costs towards the budget. The EAC needs to make sure planned initiatives like the monetary union, customs union, and unifying education systems are well coordinated and successful before widening.  [1] Dr. Khoti, Kamanga, ‘EAC Integration; progress achieved, challenges and opportunities’, ippmedia.com, 3 Nov 2013,   [2] The World Bank, ‘Data; Congo,Dem Rep, world development indicators, worldbank.org,   [3] The World Bank, ‘Data;South Sudan,word development indicators,worldbank.org,


Al shabaab attacks have continued to be a huge threat to both the Ugandan and Kenyan governments with the recent attack on Westgate shopping center in Nairobi [1] and the Lugogo cricket ground in Kampala [2] despite the tight immigration policies towards Somalis. FDLR has also continued to carry out attacks in Rwanda regardless Rwanda’s efforts to prevent them [3]. Tighter immigration controls therefore has been shown not to provide solution to these threats. Instead uniting all these countries would give ground for the East African Military Command to handle such threats.  [1] AFP, ‘Westgate mall, Alshabaab gunmen were suicide commandos’, telegraph.co.uk,12 Nov 2013,   [2] BBC world news, ‘Somali militants behind Kampala world cup bombings’, bbc.co.uk, 12 July 2010,   [3] Reuters, ‘Rwanda says FDLR cross from Congo attack wardens’, reuters.com, 2 Dec 2012,


We may agree that an active civil society may be good for the economy. However, there is no need for African governments to ensure CSOs have a wider participation in the political life of the country to do this. As long as the government respects and protects the existence of such organizations, their positive economic by-products are preserved. Societal actors can work autonomously and independently of the political system.


Civil society is good for economic development  There is increasing evidence that a more active and involved Civil Society is good for economic development [1] . Specifically, CSOs are believed to have a crucial role for African development prospects. The Local Economic Development Network of Africa argues that ‘In particular, they often know what are the employment and income generation needs of different groups within the population and what could stimulate better outcomes for them. It is very important, therefore, that they are involved and consulted’ ( LEDNA, 2013). In addition CSOs autonomously implement development programmes. Only to give an example, in Nepal CSOs in the Education for Income Generation program have played a crucial role in building up workers skills resulting in 80% being in employment many striking out entrepreneurially on their own5. It is therefore necessary for African governments to guarantee such organizations and grant them a wider participation.  [1] Panth, Sabina, (25 February 2011) ‘What Role Does Civil Society Play in Economic Development?’, blogs.worldbank.org


The idea that CSO’s involvement in political life equals good governance is essentially an oversimplification. In extremely corrupt semi-democracies, there is no guarantee that societal actors will not be co-opted within the system and become corrupted themselves [1] . This would result in a legitimation of the non-democratic powers in the public eye, rather than a promotion of better practices and good governance. We could say that a wider role for civil society is desirable only for those countries that are well ahead in the path of democratisation. The risk is, otherwise, to trigger a counterproductive reaction.  [1] Mogalakwe and Sebudubudu (2006) ‘Trends in state-civil society relations in Botswana’, Journal of African Elections, 5:2, pp. 207-224


Civil society’s involvement in political life is necessary to strengthen democratic accountability  The involvement of civil society in political life is all the more crucial in Africa, where newborn democracies need to be strengthened and consolidated. Active CSOs function as a watchdog for political power and as alternative channels for citizens’ political participation, thus strengthening democratic accountability. Indeed, several scholars highlight that a ‘prostrate civil society’ is to be identified as a fundamental factor in determining the region’s democratic instability (Scott, 1998, as quoted in Lewis, 2002: 576). ‘Civil society is a hitherto (missing key) to sustained political reform, legitimate states and governments, improved governance, viable state-society and state-economy relations, and prevention of the kind of political decay that undermined new African governments a generation ago’(Harberson, 1994: 1-2). The sustainability of African democracies thus depends on the promotion of a more active and participative civil society.


There is no consensus on the assumption that CSOs may function as alternative channels of accountability. This, in fact, would require CSOs to be democratically accountable themselves. Yet, this is not the case. There is no form of direct accountability between Civil Society Organizations and the communities they claim to represent. In other words, no one ‘elects Oxfam’ [1] . Moreover, CSOs are not even representative of the people they are supposed to give voice to. In fact, wealthy and highly educated men are overrepresented in CSOs [2] . It is therefore hard to understand how civil society can guarantee or increase democratic accountability in African countries.  [1] The Economist, 23rd September 2000, p. 129  [2] Talberg and Uhlin (2011) ‘Civil society and global democracy. An assessment’, in Archibugi, Koenig Archibugi and Marchetti, Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press


The involvement of CSOs promotes good governance practices  Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has stated that ‘good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development’ [1] . It is therefore impossible to ignore the claim that CSOs involvement in political life is crucial to promote good governance practices. Civil Society is able to create additional pressure on the government to ensure good governance, as well as to contribute ideas about what good governance practices should entail in the specific local context, and to ‘bridge the gap between the law and its actual implementation’( Zivanovic, 2007). “Good governance in Africa is ultimately going to come from civil society in the countries themselves”, declared Jendayi Frazer, former U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs [2] . An article in The Guardian shows how CSO’s can help: ‘In the Ileje district of southern Tanzania, expectant mothers about to give birth had to cross a crocodile-infested river into Malawi because a local medical centre did not have enough money to pay for a midwife.  It took a campaign by civil society organisations and citizens to uncover that there was money available, but that it had somehow been diverted’ [3] . CSOs involvement ultimately permitted the solution of the issue.  [1] Kofi Annan, Partnerships for Global Community: Annual Report on the Work of the Organisation (UN, 1998)  [2] Cannon, H. Brevy, (4 May 2009), ‘Diplomat: Civil Society Is Key To Good Governance in Africa’, UVA Today  [3] Kilonzo, Semkae, (30 September 2013) ‘Tanzania has shown how civil society can contribute to economic justice’, theguardian.com


Two crucial counterpoints can be opposed to the above argument. First of all, we may agree that western NGOs organize, support or fund African CSOs. However, this does not mean that African civil society is not independent in its action and able to defend its own interests and values. Secondly, even if we accept that western actors may interfere with the activity of African CSOs, we must consider if this is the worst of evils. Someone may argue, and we certainly do, that it is still worth ensuring civil society has a voice in African politics, even if this brings the risk of western interference.


Despite the arguments underlining the differences between Western and African contexts, there is evidence that civil society may play in Africa the same crucial and positive role it had in Western political history. Indeed, the EU commissioner for development, Andris Piebalgs, has issued a press release specifically analysing the role civil society may play in African politics [1] . The conclusions highlight that a wider involvement of civil society in Africa’s political life is crucial for the prospects of democratization and development in the continent.  [1] Piebalgs, Andris, (24 October 2013), ‘Civil Society Organisations, a key role to play in Africa-EU relations’, Europa.eu


An excessively active civil society would increase political instability and paralyse African states  CSOs involvement in the political life does have positive and relevant consequences, but only if the state is strong and the political power is stable. In the African context, several scholars argue, an excessively active civil society may instead increase political instability and paralyze an already weak state. Blair (1997), for example, affirms that CSOs may advance so many different claims and interests that the result is a political paralysis. A weaker state, rather than a deeper democracy, results. Similarly, Foley and Edwards (1996), analysing the ‘paradox of civil society’, point out that conflicts may arise among groups in civil society. ‘These conflicts, in the absence of specifically political settlements, may spill over into civil disruption and violence’ (1996: 40). The example of India reported above is extremely relevant in this regard. In addition, several scholars argue that Trade Unions and CSOs in general have represented an obstacle for both economic development and political stability in Latin America. African states must stabilize and consolidate before integrating civil society in their political life


The promotion of civil society is yet another form of the Western imperialism  CSOs in Africa are constituted by western NGOs or funded by western actors. It has even been argued that the involvement of western actors in African civil society cannot be avoided, since western NGOs need to function as intermediaries between funders and local groups [1] . In addition, western NGOs are easily co-opted by western governments, and tend to promote western interests and values rather than local ones [2] . In short, CSOs’ wider involvement in African political life would result in an increased western influence on African affairs. Sseremba, A journalist from Uganda, even claims that western NGOs are ‘indoctrinating young African politicians to serve western interests’ [3] . It is therefore necessary to find another way to ensure African citizens are actively involved in the policy making process.  [1] INTRAC, (2012), ‘Supporting civil society in Africa’, baringfoundation.org.uk  [2] Talberg and Uhlin (2011) ‘Civil society and global democracy. An assessment’, in Archibugi, Koenig Archibugi and Marchetti, Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  [3] Sseremba, Yahya, (10 May 2012), ‘THE NEXT PUPPETS: How NGOs are indoctrinating young African politicians to serve western interests’, The Campus Journal


Western European experiences do not demonstrate that civil society’s involvement in politics would be positive in the African context  The idea that CSOs involvement in political life would have positive consequences has been generated by a western-centric literature. However, there is no evidence that the same results would materialize in a completely different context such as the African one. Maina (1998), for example, claims that relations of class and ethnicity are so important in Africa that it is hard to imagine civil society would work in the same way it has in the west. CSOs could form along ethnic or religious lines, thus damaging the fabric of society and jeopardising the stability of divided countries. Ashutosh Varshney (2001), for example, analysed how CSOs formed exclusively along ethnic lines in certain areas in India, thus causing an increase in ethnic violence and political instability. We must therefore be very careful in applying western paradigms to non-western countries, the risk being otherwise to do more harm than good.


The opposite may actually be the case. Several authors in fact claim that an active civil society can improve political stability. A weak state consolidates its power by democratising and acquiring legitimacy. Civil society is crucial in this regard. ‘Civil society contributes directly to stability by encouraging citizens to address their concerns through democratic political processes, including elections. It also challenges abuses of power that fuel instability ’, Freedom House reports [1] . Indeed, the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) (2000) [2] identified an increased participation of Civil Society in African states as essential to promote stability in the continent. A wider involvement of CSOs in the political life must therefore be pursued all the most in the African context, where the political power needs both consolidation and democratization.  [1] Calingaert, Daniel, (11 July 2013), ‘Resisting the Global Crackdown on Civil Society’, Freedom House  [2] OHCHR, ‘Compilation of documents…’, ohchr.org


The G8 countries are the world’s most powerful countries. As such most of the powers involved in the G8 have at some point been involved in aggressive foreign interventions. The Iraq invasion did not lead to calls to throw the US and UK out, neither did the bombing of Libya lead to France’s expulsion. Using Russian actions in Ukraine as an excuse would be simple hypocrisy.


Aggressive acts violate the meaning of the G8  The focus of the G8 is on economic, monetary, financial and globilisation issues. Aggressive actions scare the markets – as shown by the rouble reaching new lows against the dollar and Euro – so run counter to the focus of the G8. [1] Russia has in the past also used its gas supplies as an economic weapon, this and acts of aggression such as in Crimea are repudiating the idea of globilisation. The G8 is important because there is “a good understanding among G8 members” clearly when one of those members is engaging in conflictual acts that understanding is damaged. [2] The G7 members on 2nd March 2014 in a statement responding to Russia’s aggression in the Crimea stated “Russia’s actions in Ukraine also contravene the principles and values on which the G-7 and the G-8 operate”. [3] Any member that does not follow the principles of an organisation should be suspended as a member.  [1] BBC News, ‘Russian rouble hits new low against the dollar and euro’, 3 March 2014  [2] Government of France, ‘The G8’, g8.fr, 2003  [3] Office of the Press Secretary, ‘G-7 Leaders Statement’, whitehouse.gov, 2 March 2014


It is wrong to say that Russia is not an industrialised country, it is considered by the World Bank to be a high income country. [1] It is also a democracy that holds regular elections. President Putin is held in high regard by Russians 67.8% of Russians approve of Putin’s job performance [2] – far higher than any other member of the G8.  [1] The World Bank, ‘Russian Federation’, data.worldbank.org, accessed 7 March 2014  [2] Luhn, Alec, ‘Ukraine crisis and Olympics boost Vladimir Putin’s popularity in Russia’, The Guardian, 6 March 2014 , note however the pollster is state run!


There needs to be a response to bad behaviour internationally  The intention of international institutions is to bind countries together, to ensure they speak to each other and resolve differences, and to ensure they feel they cannot engage in aggressive actions. However when a state breaks these norms there needs to be a reaction. Russia has been willing to engage in aggressive acts time and time again. The recent occupation of Crimea is very similar to Russia’s war with Georgia in 2008; in both conflicts Russia used the excuse of Russians being in danger, in both cases Russia was there as a ‘peacekeeper’, and in both cases the action was in another sovereign country whose government did not wish Russian troops there. The result is an expansion of Russian influence and some form of annexation. [1] There was no action after the Russian conflict with Georgia except a mediated peace. [2] There now needs to be a response to actions in Crimea; throwing Russia out of the G8 is the least response.  [1] Friedman, Uri, ‘Putin’s Playbook: The Strategy Behind Russia’s Takeover of Crimea’, The Atlantic, 2 March 2014  [2] King, Charles, ‘The Five-Day War’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008  Traynor, Ian, Luke Harding and Helen Womack, ‘Georgia and Russia declare ceasefire’, theguardian.com, 16 August 2008


If there needs to be a response to Russian actions it does not need to be this response. Much more useful would be economic sanctions against Russia; either targeted freezing of state assets and the assets of leaders, or more comprehensive sanctions that would damage Russia’s economy. Such actions would provide a real cost to aggressive action, not simply a symbolic cost. [1]  [1] Verhofstadt, Guy, ‘Russia will bow to economic pressure over Ukraine, so the EU must impose it’, theguardian.com, 6 March 2014


Sanctions by necessity harm both sides. However Russia is a much smaller economy than either the EU or US (both of which are seven-eight times bigger). Any economic retaliation and escalation will therefore harm Russia more. The threat to cut off gas supplies is a major threat but Russia can’t simply sell the gas elsewhere because its pipelines mostly go to Europe. In the 2009 ‘gas war’ which involved supplies to Europe being restricted (though not completely cut off) for 20 days Russia’s state gas company Gazprom lost $1.1billion in revenues. [1] A more complete cut off would have higher losses.  [1] Pugliaresi, Lucian et al., ‘Is it time for Gazprom to hit the reset button?’, Oil&Gas Journal, 3 September 2009


Russia should never have been a member  The G8 has been meant to be a group of industrialised democracies. Russia is neither particularly industrialised, nor particularly democratic. Russia remains reliant on natural resources for much of its wealth; 30% of its GDP and 70% of exports. [1] Its most recent presidential election – that voted in Putin for a third term – was not exactly free and fair. The OSCE election observers concluded “There was no real competition and abuse of government resources ensured that the ultimate winner of the election was never in doubt”. [2] Its qualifications for membership have been questioned from the very beginning, when Russia joined the G7 were able to argue inclusion would bring it closer to the west. Yet Russia remains essentially an outsider in the group, it does not share western values and goes its own way. [3]  [1] Aron, Leon, ‘The political economy of Russian oil and gas’, American Enterprise Institute, 11 April 2013  [2] Eschenbaecher, Jens-Hagen, ‘Russia’s presidential election marked by unequal campaign conditions, active citizens’ engagement, international observers say’, OSCE, 4 March 2012  [3] Dempsey, Judy, ‘Judy Asks: Is Russia Relevant in the G8?’, Carnegie Europe, 19 June 2013


The biggest action the west can take without sanctions  European states, which make up half of the members of the G8, have been reluctant to take stronger economic steps against aggressive Russian actions. Russia has warned the US “We will encourage everybody to dump US Treasury bonds, get rid of dollars as an unreliable currency and leave the US market.” [1] The European countries have more reason to be concerned because they rely on Russia for their gas supplies; 39% of German gas and 9% of total energy consumption is reliant on Russia. [2] If Russia were to retaliate to sanctions it could seriously damage the European economy. This means that throwing Russia out of the G8 or other institutions is the biggest sanction that does not have any risk of economic retaliation and escalation that damage everyone.  [1] RIA Novosti, ‘Putin Adviser Urges Dumping US Bonds In Reaction to Sanctions’, 4 March 2013  [2] Ratner, Michael et al., ‘Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification’, Congressional Research Service, 20 August 2013, p.10


But Russia, as with any country – particularly any powerful country – is interested in symbolism and international prestige. Many analysts suggest that Putin’s takeover of Crimea may be about revenge for having ‘lost’ Ukraine, or out of a desire to set up a new greater Russia. [1] In each of these cases it is about prestige as the practical gains to Russia are small. Russia wants to be seen as a great power, kicking it out of one of the globe’s top clubs damages that ambition.  [1] Speck, Ulrich, ‘Opinion Putin planning ‘Soviet Union lite’’, CNN, 4 March 2014


The address by Putin was before Russia’s illegal intervention into Crimea and as such ‘settling regional conflicts’ almost certainly refers to Syria, not Crimea. Russia’s role in Syria has hardly been constructive, it has until recently stopped any resolutions on Syria [1] , but not so onerous as to require throwing the country out of the G8. With Putin in charge of the summit and so setting the agenda we can be sure that discussion of Crimea will be kept off the agenda so ensuring that any discussion is purely informal. Putin is hardly likely to make concessions at his own summit.  [1] BBC News, ‘Syria crisis: UN Security Council agrees aid resolution’, 23 February 2014


Allows strength in numbers  Russia was originally allowed in to the G8 to encourage it to reform, or rather to provide a place where Russia’s leader can be backed into reforming. The G8 is a western institution, a forum in which an aggressive Russia has no natural allies. This means that it is the perfect place for the western democracies to voice their concerns; Russia will find itself isolated at the table and on the back foot. While at its own summit it will be even more likely to give concessions in the interests of making its own summit a success. At the last G8 summit Putin hosted in 2006 Russia made some concessions to the US in order to try and obtain WTO membership. [1]  [1] Rutland, Peter, ‘Russia and the WTO: deal, or no deal?’, National Bureau of Asian Research, Special Report no.12, March 2007. Pp31-36, p.32


Simply narrows the G8 making it irrelevant  The G8 has been losing its relevance with the rise of other countries economically. It can no longer claim to be the top eight economies as Canada is the world’s eleventh largest economy with India, Brazil and China all bigger. It is even lower (14th) if done by Purchasing Power Parity. [1] Newer more inclusive institutions such as the G20 that include other vital economies like China have been taking over its primacy on the economy. The G8 is no longer the best grouping to steer the global economy as was recognised during the 2008 financial crisis where the G20 took the lead. [2] Throwing out Russia would simply be making the G8 narrower and less important globally so reducing the institution’s influence.  [1] The World Bank, ‘GDP (current US$)’, data.worldbank.org, 2012 figures  [2] Cooper, Andrew F., ‘The G20 as an improvised crisis committee and/or a contested ‘steering committee’ for the world’, International Affairs, Vol.86, No.3, 2010 pp.741-757


Will make no difference to Russia  Throwing Russia out of the G8 to punish the country – whether for aggressive acts in its near abroad, for human rights violations, or simply for corruption and economic crimes – is unlikely to make any difference to Russia. [1] Being in the G8 provides very little tangible benefit; it is all about the symbolism of it being the top club. Russia however has created its own top club in the BRICS conferences that are very similar to the G8 as a series of informal gatherings of major world leaders. Russia could rightly argue that despite having fewer members it is broader and more inclusive as it includes members from the Americas (Brazil), from Africa (South Africa), and the important players from of Eurasia (Russia, China, India). Since these powers are the rising countries why would Russia want to be associated with the declining west?  [1] Judah, Ben, ‘Why Russia No Longer Fears the West’, Politico, 2 March 2014


There needs to be a place to talk  German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier argues that "The format of the G8 is actually the only one in which we in the West can speak directly with Russia". [1] Russia’s proposed priorities for the G8 summit included “fighting the drug menace, combating terrorism and extremism, settling regional conflicts, safeguarding people's health, and establishing a global management system to address risks associated with natural and man-made disasters” [2] since Russia is clearly willing to discuss regional conflicts then it makes sense to use the summit to discuss Ukraine. Since Russia has not turned up to other suggested talks, such as a meeting of the Budapest agreement group [3] (UK, US, Ukraine, Russia – the agreement guarantees Ukraine’s territorial integrity [4] ), it makes sense to go to Russia’s summit which Russia can’t avoid.  [1] kms/ccp, ‘Putin agrees to Ukraine 'fact-finding' mission after talk with Merkel’, Deutsche Welle, 2 March 2013  [2] Putin, Vladimir, ‘Address by President Vladimir Putin on Russia assuming the G8 Presidency’, en.g8russia.ru, 1 January 2014  [3] G uardian Staff, ‘Only talks between Russia and Ukraine can solve crisis, say US and UK’, theguardian.com, 5 March 2014  [4] Presidents of Ukraine, Russian Federation and United States of America, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, ‘Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances, 1994’, cfr.org, 5 December 1994


Getting rid of Russia would not make the G8 irrelevant; it would simply return it to its core. The remaining members would me much more likely to agree and actually come up with meaningful outcomes to the summits. It might be a less effective steering committee for the global economy but at the same time it could ensure greater unity between the western powers.


While strength in numbers may seem to be useful when there are conflicts between Russia and the other G8 members this is not what the G8 should be about. Using the G8 in such a way will simply encourage Russia to dig its heels in and encourage the growth of other rival institutions. An example would be the BRIC summits between Brazil, Russia, India and China; would these have happened at all if the G8 has been more inclusive and recognised that these nations need to be involved in the G8? It is notable that the very first summit included discussion of the desire by India and Brazil to play a greater role in world affairs. [1]  [1] Presidents of Russia, Brazil, China and Prime Minister of India, ‘Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders’, kremlin.ru, 16 June 2009


This is claiming exactly the opposite of the previous point on U.S. demand for drugs; is not Mexican demand for guns as much to blame for guns in Mexico as U.S. supply? The US has put considerable effort into making sure that the Mexicans are able to counter cartels armed with guns with U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers training Mexican army commandoes. Similarly the Marine Corps also is working on an exchange program with the Mexican Marine Corps that will include sharing experiences on urban warfare. The US also arms the Mexican armed forces to prevent them being outgunned by the gangs. [1]  [1] Bowman, Tom, 'CIA And Pentagon Wonder: Could Mexico Implode?' NPR.


U.S. supplies the guns used by drugs cartels  While the US complains about the Mexico’s inability to stop drugs flowing north the USA seems equally unable to stop guns and weapons flowing south into Mexico. As Clinton says “Our inability to prevent weapons from being illegally smuggled across the border to arm these criminals causes the deaths of police officers, soldiers and civilians.” Clinton argues that one problem is that the bad guys outgun the law enforcement officers and so is supplying Mexico with better equipment such as night vision goggles, [1] however at least in the short term the only result can be an arms race and more violence as shown by the increasing violence in 2010 and 2011. [2] So long as the cartels are able to easily buy guns then the problem will not be solved. Here again the United States is to blame. The United States has 54,000 licenced gun dealers while Mexico only has one heavily guarded compound so the cartels smuggle their weapons in from the U.S. [3]  [1] BBC News, ‘Clinton admits US blame on Drugs’, 26 March 2009.  [2] AFP, ‘Mexico drug death toll rising again in 2011’, Fracne24, 11 January 2011.  [3] Beaubien, Jason ‘At Mexico’s Lond Gun Shop, Army Oversees Sales’, NPR, 24 June 2009.


There will always be two ways to solve the problem of illegal drugs, focusing on demand and focusing on supply. Focusing on supply is a valid strategy, as the US pushes the price of drugs on US streets up so it pushes the drugs beyond the ability of most people to afford the drugs and will as a result mean less drug addicts in the United States. This in turn could result in a drop in supply.


U.S. demand for drugs  It is the rich US that creates the demand for drugs in the first place. Without this demand the price of drugs would be low and the profits of drugs trafficking through Mexico to the USA would disappear. In 2010 an estimated 22.6 million Americans aged 12 or over were illicit drug users. [1] And this immense drugs market was estimated to provide Mexican cartels with earnings between $13.6 and $48.4 billion. [2] Drugs are therefore a problem that is best dealt with from the perspective of reducing demand. Hillary Clinton accepted this when she said “Our insatiable demand for illegal drugs fuels the drug trade”. However the US' answer to the drugs problem has so far been the 'war on drugs' concentrating massive investment on trying to reduce supply and this includes funding the Mexican government in its war as well and at the same time as making this admission Clinton was giving $80 million to provide Mexico with Blackhawk helicopters. [3]  [1] Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, ‘Results from the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Summary of National Findings’, NSDUH Series H-41, HHS Publication No. (SMA) 11-4658. Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2011.  [2] Cook, Colleen W., ‘Mexico’s Drug Cartels’, CRS Report for Congress, 16 October 2007, p.4  [3] BBC News, ‘Clinton admits US blame on Drugs’, 26 March 2009.


Mexico has its own problems with drugs consumption so the demand problem can’t all be blamed on the US. Mexico City's former chief of police, Gertz Manero has said there are now 4.5 million crimes a year committed in Mexico. "90% of those are stealing or are related to stealing. And 90% of those are for less than 8,000 pesos (about US$727). Mostly this is for drugs." Unemployment due to liberalisation of the economy has led to mass drug consumption so drugs would continue to flow into Mexico and enrich the cartels even if the U.S. drugs market dried up. [1]  [1] Evans, Leslie, 'Electoral Democracy Has Yet to Shake Mexico's Corrupt Bureaucracy', UCLA International Institute, 16 March 2005.


These were alien criminals who should never have been in the United States in the first place. The blame for these people being able to create drugs cartels in Central America should not lie with the United States for deporting these people but with the Central American states for not then monitoring and controlling these returnees.


U.S. anti-drugs policy focuses on the supply of drugs not the root problem of demand  For the last two decades the USA has been focused on the supply side of reducing the drugs trade. Making it a 'war on drugs' forces a fight back from the drugs cartels leading to gunfights and instability in the countries en route. This happened in Columbia, in Peru and now in Mexico. The focus on supply, or else the containment of drugs in Mexico, is shown by the Obama's US-Mexico border policy press release that devotes a lot more space to extra boarder security to catching the drugs as they reach the US compared with one small paragraph on demand. [1] The U.S. war on drugs focusing on supply and transit routes has clearly failed and has been failing for decades. Back in 1992 Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori declared the war a failure while claiming that between 1980 and 1990, when the U.S. was engaging in military efforts to stop production and transportation, coca production increased tenfold. [2]  [1] Napolitano, Janet et al. ‘Administration Officials announce U.S.-Mexico Border Security Policy: A comprehensive response & commitment’, The White House, 24 March 2009.  [2] Williams, Ray B., ‘Why “The War on Drugs” Has Failed’, Psychology Today, 6 June 2011.


U.S. policies have helped create the cartels  A change in US immigration law in 1996 meant that non-citizens and foreign born citizens sentenced to more than a year in jail are deported. This moved the problem from the USA’s cities to cities in Central America creating new gangs that were already bound by ties created in the US. Effectively gangs created in the US thrived in central America where they were able to overwhelm the local government and spread north to Mexico and back into the USA helping create the network of gangs and drugs traffickers that plague Mexico today. [1] Similarly the problems in Mexico represent the success of the US in cutting of the routes through the Caribbean used previously by drugs traffickers. Colombian criminals as a result simply switched routes and began smuggling cocaine and heroin through the Central American isthmus and Pacific routes. Both smuggling routes led through Mexico. The successes of the war on drugs in Columbia has reduced the size of the drugs groups in Columbia reducing their ability to control the whole route to the USA making room for the Mexicans to take the role of middleman through Central America. [2]  [1] Wolfe, Adam, 'Central America's Street Gangs Are Drawn into the World of Geopolitics', Power and Interest News Report, 25th Aug. 2005.  [2] Logan, Samuel, ''Mexico's Internal Drug War'', Power and Interest News Report, 14th August 2006.


As Mexico’s biggest trading partner the United States always has a major role in the state of the Mexican economy. The United States is also partially to blame for the Peso crisis. Wall St in particular played up a ‘Mexican miracle’ helping to create a bubble, and idea that was also boosted by the US government which was making the case for the North American Free Trade Agreement at the time. [1]  We should also not be too quick to blame the economy as there is always some uncertainty in the figures; using different statistical methods you get different results. A study implies a growth rate of household income for Mexico of 4½-5½ percent per year in 1984-2006, which is substantially higher than the 2 percent implied by standard methods. [2] If this was the case then a poor economy could not be seen as much of a factor in the increase in violence and drugs trafficking.  [1] Edwards, Sebastian, ‘The Mexican Peso Crisis: How much did we know? When did we know it?’ NBER working paper series, Working paper 6334, p.4  [2] Carvalho Filho, Irineu de, and Chamon, Marcos, ‘The Myth of Post-Reform Income Stagnation: Evidence from Brazil and Mexico’, IMF working paper, (Aug. 2008), p.27.


Mexico’s government is no weaker than any other government. The country in Central America which has the lowest homicide rate is Costa Rica, [1] a country which has no standing army. [2] Yet it suffers from many of the same disadvantages that Mexico has, for example, like Mexico it is on the drugs route to the United States. This implies that at the very least having a weak government is not the whole cause of Mexico’s conflict.  Yes there is a weak government in Mexico, particularly at the local level, but we need to ask ourselves how the government becomes so subverted. The answer is money. There have been allegations that President Vicente Fox allowed the most powerful drug lord to escape prison in 2001 in return for $20 million. [3] If the very top of the governmental hierarchy can be subverted for money then the rest is as well.  [1] Schwarz, Isabella Cota, ‘Homicide rate drops to lowest in region’ The Tico Times, 8 June 2012.  [2] ‘Costa Rica’, The World Factbook, 24 May 2012.  [3] Rohr, Mathieu von, ‘A Nation Descends into Violence’, Spiegel Online, 23 December 2010.


Violence creates a downward spiral of violence  Just as the United States cannot be blamed for weak governance in Mexico it cannot be blamed for the spiral of decline that occurs as a result of that weak government. Once the police and local government are infiltrated it becomes very difficult to stop the violence. The gangs gain enough control and power that they can no longer be stopped without a massive investment by the central government. Any who do stand up to the traffickers are killed as, for example, was Alejandro Domínguez when appointed to serve as the city police chief of Nuevo Laredo. Domínguez made it clear that he would not negotiate with the cartels. As he was leaving his office on June 8 2005, his first day on the job, he was ambushed and killed by gunmen. [1]  A culture of fear exists in Mexico, as in other countries where the government fails to suppress gang warfare. Fear within the government and police force paralyses both into inaction Municipal and state officials insist that the problem is not theirs to solve, since drug trafficking is a federal crime, or they engage in denial, claiming that the situation is improving and that the violence will soon end. While journalists report the death and violence they fear to report on who caused them, the background or the causes of the violence; the media self-censors itself. [2]  [1] Althaus, Dudley, and Buch, Jason, ‘Nuevo Laredo police chief killed on street’, Houston Chronicle, 3 February 2011.  [2] Laurie Freeman, ‘State of Siege: Drug-Related Violence and Corruption in Mexico Unintended Consequences of the War on Drugs, WOLA Summer report (2006), pp.5-7.


Mexico is poor; it is the economic conditions that drive conflict not the U.S.  Declining real income drives social unrest and instability. Real incomes for workers in Mexico's manufacturing sector declined by a cumulative 2.6 percent between 1995 and 2005. It is likely that the decline in the informal economy is larger. The Government keeps a tight control over the minimum wage preventing it from rising. Although this does not affect many Mexicans directly a lot more have their wages set at a multiple of the minimum wage. At the same time there has been high unemployment and lower benefits. [1] In 1994-5 Mexico was hit hard by a financial crisis known as the ‘peso’ or ‘Tequila’ crisis. The peso depreciated by 47%, inflation went up to 52% and GDP fell by 6% not reaching its 1993 level until 1997. Unsurprisingly household income fell substantially; by 31% between 1994 and 1996, those in poverty rose from 10.4% of the population to 17% [2] Since 1996 although Mexico has experienced growth not only has it been slower than most developing countries this has been significantly cut into in real per capita terms by population growth. Mexico has large disparities in income between urban and rural areas and the gap between rich and poor has been widening. [3] The inequality leads people to be more willing to engage in the potentially lucrative drugs trafficking and the informal economy. Unemployment meanwhile makes them more likely to take drugs themselves as an escape.  [1] Gundzik, Jephraim P. , ‘As Elections Approach, Mexico Faces Internal Instability', Power and Interest News report.  [2] Baldacci, Emanuele, Luiz de Mello and Gabriela Inchauste, Financial crises, Poverty and Income distribution, IMF Working paper, pp.20-21.  [3] Economy Watch, ‘Mexico Economy’, 24 March 2010.


Weak Mexican government is to blame not the U.S.  When there is an internal conflict such as this it is almost always a weak government that is to blame for not preventing an escalation of violence. The government is to blame as it is meant to have a monopoly on the use of force, conflicts such as this drugs war occur when that monopoly on violence is broken. In Mexico the election of Vicente Fox as president may have been a democratic triumph for ending the 70 year one party rule by the P.R.I. but in terms of the effectiveness of the central government it was not a success. The National Action Party has been weak in the lower house and senate so unable to advance a legislative agenda. [1] An inability to legislate significantly reduces the ability of the federal government to respond to the drugs crisis. This reduces the ability of the Federal government to step in and sort out local problems. There has been an upsurge of social unrest of all types, not just drugs violence but protests, riots and strikes as well. [2]  Drugs traffickers have taken over many local areas, the local government, police and even some of the army has been penetrated by the drugs traffickers. This leaves the local government unable to do anything against the traffickers. It was not the drugs traffickers who created the institutional problems that allowed the government to become penetrated in the first place; corruption, inefficient police forces and a weak judiciary were already a problem. [3]  [1] The Economist, ‘The siesta congress’, 21 January 2012.  [2] Gundzik, Jephraim P. , ‘As Elections Approach, Mexico Faces Internal Instability', Power and Interest News report.  [3] Freeman, Laurie, ‘State of Siege: Drug-Related Violence and Corruption in Mexico Unintended Consequences of the War on Drugs, WOLA Summer report (2006), p.2.


The United States can be blamed for the downward spiral. There would not be a downward spiral of fear and violence if the United States was not a source of arms for the cartels.


Language politics exist, and this is a consideration for any politician, not to be ignored. States may find it politically wise to encourage multilingualism. For example, Nicolas Sarkozy wants France to be a bilingual country. This is indeed a tall order, but we must not dismiss and avoid challenges simply because of the effort they entail. Sarkozy’s desire to make such efforts is commendable and other EU Member States should follow suit by becoming multilingual.


The status quo is impractical, because we expect MEPs to be multilingual in order to be effective.  It is highly demanding to request all MEPs to be multilingual and translation and interpreting time takes time out of the meetings when vital issues could and should be discussed and addressed and in which problems should be solved. They have been elected on the strength of their political abilities, not their language skills. If we require all MEPs to be multilingual, we are actually excluding many politicians who could be very skilled, but don’t speak enough languages for the EU.


Working through many languages in the European Union costs money that could be spent on EU’s projects rather than unnecessary conversation.  It is very expensive to employ translators and interpreters, and to publish all documents in French as well as English. Ireland Business News reported that the EU’s translation (excluding interpreting) costs were 800 million Euros in 2006. This money is better spent on the EU’s actual practices.


There are often no direct translations for indispensible EU-specific vocabulary, so Member States should refer to it in their native language. The European Union uses in its debates and practices lots of technical jargon. For such vocabulary, there is often not a direct translation. The Member States must be able to speak about such important issues effectively and, while there exists no direct translations for much EU jargon, the best way to do this is through their native languages.


There already exists a pan-European identity across all EU Member States, and a single working language would help to strengthen that identity.  There is no need for any prefixed or specified Europeans anymore. Given that the continent of Europe is merging into one single identity, there is no need to have more than one working EU language in operation; this could create divisions and even tensions within the overall identity of ‘European’. The Euro coins are no longer specific to each nation, goods are bought and sold between EU nations without restrictions. The seams between the European nations are fast disappearing as they merge ever closer together. Therefore, one singe language for managing all the EU Member States’ communal affairs makes perfect sense.


The EU ought to make English its working language in order to be a more transparent democracy for the rest of the world.  If the EU uses the global language of English as its working language, other governments, parliaments and Unions will be able to understand its activities and methods of operation. 27% of the world’s population speak English. In the EU Member States alone, there are 61, 850,000 native English speakers and 168,000,000 non- native speakers of English. [1] It is a medium that could reach so many people and through which the EU can influence other governments to take similar positive action. So many of the world’s large problems stem from a lack of communication. War is often the result of two sides being unable to communicate and mediate, and so violence is resorted to. It is often described as ‘the only language the enemy understands’ because of a failure to work out differences in a non-violent way. When fighting breaks out, it brings with it all manner of other issues such as famine and trauma. English is a global language and the EU should use this to its advantage. The EU brings democracy and should serve as a great example thereof for the rest of the world. Populations of all other countries need to be able to understand the EU’s activity and the way to operate a democracy as demonstrated by the EU, and the way to achieve this is for the EU to use the global language of English so as to render transparent the running of a democracy, so that it can spread. If the EU can communicate its good ideas successfully, it can influence other organisations, providing them with the antidotes to their own problems.  [1] Wikipedia, List of countries by English-speaking population, en.wikipedia.org


So many of the world’s problems stem from a lack of communication. War is often a result of two sides unable to mediate, and one side often refers to resorting violence as ‘the only language the opponent understands’. This is what prompted Sir Winston Churchill to say ‘To jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war’. [1] He meant that communication and compromise are always better than resorting to conflict, not least of all because it brings with it new problems of poverty, mentally scarred people and famine.  However, communication works both ways: what is said and how well it is heard. The EU cannot simply assume its activities will be well listened to. Its own issues and actions have little in common with the governments in the developing world who truly need help and improved strategies. For example, the EU deals with those problems facing a developed world; health, education, governmental services. By contrast, those governments in the developing world are faced with a whole array of problems that bear no resemblance to these, and far more serious ones; child soldiers, the setting up of schools, as opposed to making improvements therein. Therefore, listening to the EU will not inspire, advise or help the governments of those countries who really need it, regardless of how easily accessible and understandable the information is.  [1] Platt, Suzy ed., Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations, 1989.


Europe is only an umbrella identity; the diverse elements that form it must not be ignored. European identity is comprised of many elements, these being the many different countries within the continent. These different countries assert their individual identities through culture, people, traditions and languages. These must be acknowledged so that the EU is aware of the identities of the very Member States that comprise it. Keeping languages alive in the face of language death is a very emotive issue. Such response to one’s own language is what makes us human. To deny people affection for their own language is to dehumanise them. In the whole, if the EU tried to strengthen its identity by choosing one language, it would harm its true identity, as a group of diverse states, joined together.


It is favourable that the EU employs people and one large way it does so is by hiring linguists and translators. Unemployment needs to be kept down and is an issue the EU claims to take seriously.  The EU has the largest translation unit in the world. It employs some 1, 650 permanent onsite linguists and 550 support staff, as well as freelance translators all over the world. [1] A Connect Euranet debate took place in France in which the EU representatives and ministers spoke of the urgent need to address the pressing issues of employment and unemployment. It is unjustifiable for the EU to fight unemployment and also render a large proportion of its staff- the linguists- out of work.  [1] Nitobe Centre for language democracy, ‘FAQ – Translation/interpretation’.


Politics touches on emotional issues. Emotional issues specific to a country are best expressed by that country in their native language. If the EU Member States must communicate through a foreign language, this means there is a barrier between a) what is said and the emotion contained therein and b) the act of actually communicating it. When forced to express one’s true opinions through a foreign tongue, its true meaning or the level of its importance may become diluted, misinterpreted or otherwise compromised. It is better for EU Member States to communicate using their native languages, for this way there is a much closer emotional proximity between a) what is said and b) the emotion contained in saying it. Thus, the emotions and desires of the people are more faithfully expressed.


It is more practical to work through one language that all Member States understand in order to ensure the effectiveness of communication.  Multilingualism could lead to several breakdowns in communication, which only give rise to further problems. This is especially likely between French and English where there are many ‘false friends’. For example ‘actuellement’ in French translates into English as ‘currently’, not ‘actually’. Using only one working language will eradicate confusion and reduce the number of errors. This is especially important in the realm of international politics, where small errors can breed long-term consequences.


One working language understood by all Member States is a more practical way of communicating often untranslatable yet vital EU-specific vocabulary.  The EU does use technical jargon for which there is often not a direct translation. Therefore, it makes more sense to only have one name for each concept, by which that concept shall be known, in order to economize effort and to not waste time creating translations for EU-specific jargon. It is not chauvinistic, or even a matter of preference, to use English as a working language over other languages; it just so happens to be a language that is understood throughout the EU Member States. It is better and more effective to spend the time addressing the issues rather than deciding by which names to call these entities that give rise to issues within the EU.


Prioritising translation may well have negative results. A mistranslation can lead to severe confusion and when such sensitive information is being handled, this is not at all desirable. Further, confusion can result if one entity becomes known by two different names. The practice of translation may only create tensions and divisions between bodies within the EU. Some may be angered that their literature is not being translated, when another organisation’s literature is, and is thusly getting a higher profile and receiving more attention. Therefore, one single WORKING language makes sense.


Press freedom is a separate issue from EU language politics. The press must have reasonable freedoms, and so they are perfectly within their rights to express anti-Europe opinions; provoking debate and discussion on political issues is essential to a well-informed readership. The anti-EU arguments get more coverage than pro-EU ones, but there are many arguments in favor of the EU within the British press. Freedom of the British press to express anti-EU opinion is their right and should not affect the use of English as the single working language within the EU at all. It should not impinge upon improving the strength and effectiveness of communication within the EU at all.


Translation is an intercultural activity that the EU must embrace if it continues to hold “United in diversity” as its motto.  Ernst-August Gutt observes the use of translation “across boundaries”. [1] As a body dedicated to being “United in diversity”, the EU should practice translation in order to affect this intercultural activity. The linguist Laurence Venuti observes this: “Translation is the ‘trial of the foreign’. But in a double sense. In the first place, it establishes a relationship between the Self-Same (propre) and the foreign by aiming to open up the foreign work to us in its utter foreignness …And this trial, often an exile, can also exhibit the most singular power of the translating act: to reveal the foreign work’s most original kernel, its most deeply-buried, most self-same…most distant”. [2]  Governmental bodies such as the EU have to mediate and compromise when discussing issues and debating. Translation is simply another type of mediation. The linguist Laurence Venuti describes it as “a bilingual mediated process of communication”. [3] Translation in a political setting is therefore simply an extension of this political mediation strongly present in the European Union.  [1] Venuti, L. (ed) The Translation Studies Reader, 2000, p.378  [2] Ibid p.284  [3] Ibid p.161


If the EU ‘elects’ a single working language, it will be deliberately contributing to the narrow-minded, anglicising of the entire world, despite being a union of diverse cultures with the power to fight it.  A “single working language” implies English, a global language, and already one of the two key EU languages, the other being the lesser understood French. That English could be the default language worries the French where they fear the rise of what the French call anglosnoberrie ; the anglicising of the world at the expense of other languages including French.  The EU would become one more example of English dominating the world at the expense of the many cultures and languages of Europe. This is indeed an extremely hypocritical stance to take, when the EU is a body that seeks to strengthen intercultural activity and give all the cultures within it a voice. This cannot be done when the overwhelming majority- twenty-six- of the languages, ‘voices’, of the Member States are silenced and only one is given a platform on which to speak.


There is no need to translate absolutely everything, but prioritising translation is favourable.  EU citizens do not have to translate everything; to keep the costs of interpreters and translators down, we can just interpret and translate the most important information. This policy of ‘prioritising translation’ has been adopted by the Welsh Assembly. The Assembly translates into Welsh only the information and literature that is most relevant and will actually be read. Translation IS a realistic solution and should be considered over the EU working through one single language.


Britain is the country of Euroscepticism, and its official language is English. For English to be the medium, the mouthpiece for the EU communications is wholly wrong.  English, the language which would likely be selected as the single European language, is also the language of Euroscepticism, as perfectly demonstrated by the British press. Anderson and Weymouth explain in Insulting the public?: The British Press and the European Union, ”Even those aspects of Euroscepticism which are perceived to be founded on less mythical stuff, such as the economic arguments against the single currency, get a better coverage than any arguments in favour.” [1] Right-wing tabloids publish very anti-Europe articles, scapegoating the German Parliament, the Bundestag, for what they see as the depletion of Britain’s say in her own politics, and using vocabulary with WW2 undertones. Even The Times, the UK paper of record, has voiced highly anti-Europe sentiments. It is through such articles and press coverage as this that the derogatory term Europrat has been coined.  For English, the language of Euroscepticism, to be the official and single working language of the EU is unthinkable; it is ironic at best and ridiculous at worst.  [1] Anderson, P.J, and Antony Weymouth. Insulting the Public? The British Press and the European Union. London: Longman, 1999.


To work through one single global language that is understood by all cultures makes perfect sense; it is a medium through which they can all communicate within the context of EU operations. The EU is not asking the MEPs (Members of the European Parliament) to address their own people nor their parliament at home through the medium of English. The use of a single working language is just to ensure effectiveness when discussing and debating EU matters between Member States.


The use of English does not mean Anglo-snobbery; that is a prejudice against Anglophones. The two EU official languages are English and French. If the EU were to adopt a single WORKING language, in all likelihood it would be English, but this is not to be seen as Westminster snobbery. English is not directly synonymous with Britain. It is also the official language of the former British colonies such as America, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and is, to a large extent, a global language. Britain itself is a very Eurosceptic nation, and so the use of its official language cannot logically be taken as British rule over the EU. However, all the more Europhile countries should not feel unfairly treated in using this language to communicate; if all these pro-EU countries communicate through English i.e. a global language that is not their own, they are less likely to show any extreme bias toward their own country and culture. Embracing English, a foreign method of communication, means that in the EU debating chamber, a Member State’s arguments will not be contaminated by the connotations held within their mother tongue, and the ideas cemented within that culture. As explained by Laurence Venuti in The Translation Studies Reader, “deficiency of the receiving code has to do with…such things as individuality…and geographical origin of the speakers”. [1] Eradicating individuality reduces bias and deficiency of expression.  [1] Venuti, L. (ed) The Translation Studies Reader, 2000, p.344


Vernet sought the permission of the British consulate before establishing his colony – clearly even he thought there was ambiguity over the status of the islands.  Moreover the British and Spanish settlements ended not because of commercial failure but because of indirect pressure caused by war. If Argentinian sovereignty survives expulsion through war then presumably British sovereignty could survive temporary abandonment due to war.  It is also difficult to describe a settlement as permanent when it was on the point of collapse when the British took it over.


Argentina created a permanent settlement  Argentina formally took posession of the islands in 1820 and established permanent settlements in that decade. Previous settlements by Spain and Britain had been military in nature (garrisons). Britain did not protest to these acts of sovereignty. The Argentinean settlements were only ended by illegal military force, the first strike by an American warship, acting on its own initiative and encouraged by the British charge de affairs in Buenos Aires, and the second and last blow by a British taskforce.


If military costs are excluded, the islands are self-supporting. They are of great value because they bring rights to fishing and oil exploration. If the oil that has been detected in the islands’ territory can be extracted economically, the islands will be an even greater asset to Britain. [1] Strategically, they provide NATO with an airbase in the south Atlantic. Port Stanley was used as a supply base for the Royal Navy in WW1, resulting in the Battle of the Falkland Islands. [2]  Moreover ‘value’ means more than products and services – the value of the inhabitant’s right to self-determination is priceless  [1] Swint, Brian, ‘Oil Grab in Falkland Island Seen Tripling U.K. Reserves: Energy’, Bloomberg, 25 January 2012,   [2]


International relations  Returning the islands would vastly improve Britain’s relationship with Argentina and Latin America as a whole. This would help Britain’s diplomatic and economic ties with the region. It would also be consistent with Britain’s post-war policy of decolonisation, which has seen it withdraw from almost every other colonial possession since 1945. Not only has Britain withdrawn from India, Africa, Malaysia and much of the Caribbean, it has also handed back Hong Kong to China – surely a similar case to that of the Falkland islands and Argentina.


Argentina inherited Spain’s claim to sovereignty  Both Argentina and the islands were under Spainish sovereignty. Spain ruled the islands from Argentina – they were therefore part of the same territory – doing so free of British intervention (or complaints) from 1770 until 1811, i.e. 41 years.  Upon independence from Spain, Argentina rightfully asserted sovereignty over the former Spanish territory, a principle that would latter be known under international law as uti possidetis juris. Britain did not claim sovereignty over the islands when Spain left them in 1811. Nor did Britain immediately challenge Argentina’s assertion of sovereignty in 1820, when David Jewett claimed the islands for Argentina, or in 1825, when the first treaty between the new country and Britain was signed.


The fact that Spain never formally renounced sovereignty is irrelevant – when Britain asserted its territorial claim Spain acquiesced.  Additionally if Spain’s claim did not lapse when it evacuated its colony then surely neither did Britain’s. Nor is it obvious that Argentina should have inherited the Spanish claim to the Falklands – they lie 250 miles off the coast of mainland South America.  Britain was of course not going to immediately contest the 1816 claim as she did not yet recognise Argentina so far as Britain was concern the Argentines were not sovereign and did not have sovereignty over any of their territory – at the time the UK recognised Spanish sovereignty over the mainland that Argentina claimed.


Britain already has a working relationship with Argentina. In 2001, Tony Blair became the first British prime minister to visit Argentina since the 1982 conflict. [1] The agreements made with the Menem government show the potential for peaceful cooperation without returning the islands.  In any case, direct relations with Argentina are of little strategic or economic importance to Britain, except where they affect the Falkland Islands. Trade policy is handled on both sides at a supra-national level, through the EU and Mercosur respectively.  The Falkland Islands are simply not like other examples of decolonisation. Elsewhere Britain has given independence to the indigenous peoples of its former colonial possessions, responding to their desire for self-determination. The Falklands have no indigenous population – their inhabitants regard themselves as British in identity and have no desire to be ruled by Argentina, indeed Britain’s Prime Minister has gone so far as to say the Argentines are the ones who are sounding colonial. [2]  [1] BBC News, ‘Blair’s historic Argentina visit’, 2 August 2001,   [2] BBC News ‘Argentina outraged at Cameron’s ‘colonialism’ remarks’, 19 January 2012,


Proximity is a poor reason to make a claim to sovereignty as the Falklands lie outside the 200 mile limit that Argentina claims in the southern Atlantic. [1] The Falkland Islands today have effective self-government. They have their own elected legislature and an independent judiciary. The islands are also economically self-sufficient but for the cost of the Military Garrison – which is only necessary because of the Argentinian claim. Moreover with advances in communication the location of the settlement being thousands of miles away from Britain no longer makes much difference when it comes to governing the islands.  [1] R. Reginald & J.M. Elliot, 'Tempest in a Teapot : The Falkland Islands War', The Borgo Press, 1983,


Value  The islands are of minimal value to Britain. In an era of satellites and long-range ships and aircraft, the islands no longer have strategic value. Maintaining a garrison there is an unnecessary expense. Jorge Luis Borges (an Argentinean writer) likened the 1982 conflict to ‘two bald men fighting over a comb’. [1]  [1] ‘Jorge Luis Borges (1899-1986)’,


Distance  The Falkland Islands are 8000 miles from the UK – in the modern age it is absurd that one country can claim sovereignty over land halfway across the globe from it.  The needs and wishes of the Falkland islanders would be much better served if the government responsible for them was local.


Britain sent its soldiers to fight an unjust war. Their sacrifices do not make British occupation of the islands legal.


The British colony was established only though the expulsion of the Argentinian colony. It does not matter how long ago this happened - as the legal maxim goes ‘title does not pass with theft’.  Colonists do not have a right to self-determination. It would be absurd if a group of people could invade some land, drive off the people living there; and then state that they have acquired the right to decide for themselves to stay there. The natural consequence of that principle would be that anyone could gain property through ethnic cleansing and long enough adverse possession.


Moral Hazard  Returning the islands would imply that violence and threats are legitimate ways to conduct diplomacy. Britain would be giving in to the invasion of 1982 and Kirchner’s more recent rhetoric. This would set a dangerous precedent that Britain will abandon its interests if threatened.R


The islanders are the only ones who can decide.  It is the Falkland Islanders themselves who have to decide whose sovereignty they should fall under; British, Argentine or even potentially their own. The Falkland Islands are a democracy with a democratically elected Legislative Assembly and Executive Council (made from members of the Legislative Assembly). Similarly it has its own courts. The self-determination of the islanders is prominent in their constitution. [1] The Falklands have therefore been recognised by the British government as a nation just like the Scots, Welsh and Irish. This means that the decision on any change of sovereignty in the future will be up to the islanders alone to make. [2]  It is no longer up to Britain to simply cede the islands even if they wanted to.  [1] The Falkland Islands Constitution Order 2008, Statutory Instruments, 2008 no. 0000,   [2] Ivanov, Lyubomir, ‘The Future Of The Falkland Islands And Its People’, February 2003,


Length of occupation  The primary means of acquiring title to territory is through the effective exercise of the functions of a state within that territory. This means that Britain has a right to the territory under either ‘occupation’ (if Argentina is not considered to have occupied previously) or ‘prescription’ if it has. [1] The ICJ has stated that the claim must be  I, the possession must be exercised in the character of a sovereign  II, the possession must be peaceful and uninterrupted  III, the possession must be public  IV, the possession must endure for a certain length of time. [2]  Britain would not have difficulty arguing that it has continuously exercised sovereignty for over 170 years. It has also been peaceful (no attacking native tribes, no unrest etc). It would seem silly to transfer sovereignty to Argentina on the basis of Argentina having only occupied the islands for at most five years compared to the long period of British occupation both after and before the Argentine colony.  [1] Dixon, Martin, Textbook on International Law, 6th ed., Oxford, 2007, p.155,   [2] International Court of Justice, ‘Reports of Judgements, Advisory Opinions and Orders Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia)’, 23 December 1999,  p.62/1103