Kubernetes API server in all versions allow an attacker who is able to create a ClusterIP service and set the spec.externalIPs field, to intercept traffic to that IP address. Additionally, an attacker who is able to patch the status (which is considered a privileged operation and should not typically be granted to users) of a LoadBalancer service can set the status.loadBalancer.ingress.ip to similar effect.
cpe:2.3:a:kubernetes:kubernetes:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
044D3402-749F-4BEA-9F7E-16F7839654FE
OR
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_slice_selection_function:1.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
ADE6EF8F-1F05-429B-A916-76FDB20CEB81
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_policy:1.15.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
B4367D9B-BF81-47AD-A840-AC46317C774D
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_service_communication_proxy:1.14.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
0AB059F2-FEC4-4180-8A90-39965495055E
OR
CVSS Rating: **Medium** ([CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L))
 
This issue affects multitenant clusters. If a potential attacker can already create or edit services and pods, then they may be able to intercept traffic from other pods (or nodes) in the cluster.
 
An attacker that is able to create a ClusterIP service and set the spec.externalIPs field can intercept traffic to that IP. An attacker that is able to patch the status (which is considered a privileged operation and should not typically be granted to users) of a LoadBalancer service can set the status.loadBalancer.ingress.ip to similar effect.
This issue is a design flaw that cannot be mitigated without user-facing changes.
### Affected Components and Configurations

All Kubernetes versions are affected. Multi-tenant clusters that grant tenants the ability to create and update services and pods are most vulnerable.
### Mitigations

There is no patch for this issue, and it can currently only be mitigated by restricting access to the vulnerable features. Because an in-tree fix would require a breaking change, we will open a conversation about a longer-term fix or built-in mitigation after the embargo is lifted

To restrict the use of external IPs we are providing an admission webhook container: k8s.gcr.io/multitenancy/externalip-webhook:v1.0.0. The source code and deployment instructions are published at https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/externalip-webhook.

Alternatively, external IPs can be restricted using [OPA Gatekeeper](https://github.com/open-policy-agent/gatekeeper). A sample ConstraintTemplate and Constraint can be found here: https://github.com/open-policy-agent/gatekeeper-library/tree/master/library/general/externalip.

No mitigations are provided for LoadBalancer IPs since we do not recommend granting users *patch service/status* permission. If LoadBalancer IP restrictions are required, the approach for the external IP mitigations can be copied.
### Detection

ExternalIP services are not widely used, so we recommend manually auditing any external IP usage. Users should not patch service status, so audit events for patch service status requests authenticated to a user may be suspicious.
 
If you find evidence that this vulnerability has been exploited, please contact security@kubernetes.io
#### Acknowledgements

This vulnerability was reported by Etienne Champetier (@champtar) of Anevia.
 
/area security
/kind bug
/committee product-security
/sig network

CVE-2020-8554: Man in the middle using LoadBalancer or ExternalIPs
This is a GitHub Issue
repo:kubernetes
owner:kubernetes
Title : CVE-2020-8554: Man in the middle using LoadBalancer or ExternalIPs
Issue date:

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CVSS Rating: **Medium** ([CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L))
 
This issue affects multitenant clusters. If a potential attacker can already create or edit services and pods, then they may be able to intercept traffic from other pods (or nodes) in the cluster.
 
An attacker that is able to create a ClusterIP service and set the spec.externalIPs field can intercept traffic to that IP. An attacker that is able to patch the status (which is considered a privileged operation and should not typically be granted to users) of a LoadBalancer service can set the status.loadBalancer.ingress.ip to similar effect.
This issue is a design flaw that cannot be mitigated without user-facing changes.
### Affected Components and Configurations

All Kubernetes versions are affected. Multi-tenant clusters that grant tenants the ability to create and update services and pods are most vulnerable.
### Mitigations

There is no patch for this issue, and it can currently only be mitigated by restricting access to the vulnerable features. Because an in-tree fix would require a breaking change, we will open a conversation about a longer-term fix or built-in mitigation after the embargo is lifted

To restrict the use of external IPs we are providing an admission webhook container: k8s.gcr.io/multitenancy/externalip-webhook:v1.0.0. The source code and deployment instructions are published at https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/externalip-webhook.

Alternatively, external IPs can be restricted using [OPA Gatekeeper](https://github.com/open-policy-agent/gatekeeper). A sample ConstraintTemplate and Constraint can be found here: https://github.com/open-policy-agent/gatekeeper-library/tree/master/library/general/externalip.

No mitigations are provided for LoadBalancer IPs since we do not recommend granting users *patch service/status* permission. If LoadBalancer IP restrictions are required, the approach for the external IP mitigations can be copied.
### Detection

ExternalIP services are not widely used, so we recommend manually auditing any external IP usage. Users should not patch service status, so audit events for patch service status requests authenticated to a user may be suspicious.
 
If you find evidence that this vulnerability has been exploited, please contact security@kubernetes.io
#### Acknowledgements

This vulnerability was reported by Etienne Champetier (@champtar) of Anevia.
 
/area security
/kind bug
/committee product-security
/sig network

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